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1. Introduction
1.1. Aristotle’s puzzle about lack of control in NE 7.3: the philosophical problem
Nicomachean Ethics 7.31	 is	constructed	as	a	solution	to	Aristotle’s	first	
(and	 perhaps	 most	 important)	 puzzle	 (aporia)2 concerning	 lack	 of	
control,3	namely,	“whether	uncontrolled	people	[act]	knowingly	or	not,	
and	in	what	way	knowingly”	(NE 7.3,	1146b8–9).4	This	puzzle	arises	out	
of	a	conflict	between	two	views	of	lack	of	control.	There	is	the	ordinary	
view	according	to	which	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows,	while	she	acts,	
that	her	action	is	bad.	She	acts	as	she	does	because	she	is	overcome	
1.	 The	main	ideas	of	this	article	are	derived	from	part	of	my	doctoral	disserta-
tion,	which	was	submitted	to	Princeton	University	 in	2008.	 I	would	 like	to	
express	my	deepest	gratitude	to	my	dissertation	advisers	John	M.	Cooper	and	
Hendrik	Lorenz	for	their	many	insightful	comments,	suggestions,	and	astute	
criticisms	that	were	of	invaluable	help	to	me	both	in	writing	the	dissertation	
and	in	developing	my	ideas	further	into	their	present	form.	Earlier	versions	
of	this	paper	were	read	at	the	Comenius	University	(Slovakia),	University	of	
Toronto,	and	UC	 Irvine.	 I	would	 like	 to	 thank	 the	audiences	 for	 their	 com-
ments	and	questions,	especially	Rachel	Barney,	David	Bronstein,	Tomáš	Čana,	
David	Charles,	Sean	Greenberg,	Róbert	Maco,	Casey	Perin,	Martin	Pickavé,	
Ladislav	Sabela,	and	Jennifer	Whiting.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the	follow-
ing	people	who	have	provided	me	with	many	useful	 comments	at	various	
stages	of	this	paper:	Stewart	Duncan,	Brad	Inwood,	Ben	Mitchell-Yellin,	John	
Palmer,	and	Naly	Thaler.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	the	anonymous	review-
ers	at	the	Philosopher’s Imprint for	their	many	excellent	comments	and	Daniel	
Ehrlich	for	his	help	with	final	editing.
2.	 In	NE	7.2	Aristotle	raises	a	number	of	additional	puzzles.	These	additional	
puzzles	are	discussed	in	NE 7.4–10.
3.	 In	modern	 philosophical	 literature,	 “akrasia”	 (now	 an	 English	 word	 found	
in	the	OED)	has	come	to	refer	to	an	intentional	and	free	action	contrary	to	
one’s	better	judgment.	For	Aristotle,	however,	in	order	to	act	with	akrasia	the	
agent	must	act	on	her	non-rational	desire	(appetite)	and	against	her	decision	
(NE 3.2,	 1111b13–5;	 7.8,	 1151a6–7)	 rather	 than	 against	mere	 judgment,	 and	
she	must	experience	an	internal	psychological	conflict	between	the	decision	
and	a	non-rational	desire	(e. g.,	NE 1.13,	1102b13–25).	In	the	Aristotelian	sense,	
akratic actions	are	blameworthy	and	ethically	problematic,	but	akratic actions 
in	the	modern	sense	need	not	be	either	of	these.	In	order	to	avoid	confusion,	
I	translate	the	Greek	word	“akrasia”	as	“lack	of	control,”	reserving	the	English	
word	“akrasia”	for	the	modern	conception.
4.	 Aristotle’s	dialectical	method	starts	from	collecting	the	relevant	phenomena	
that	prominently	include	the	views	of	other	experts	on	the	relevant	subject	
(endoxai).	When	the	phenomena	conflict,	they	give	rise	to	puzzles	(aporiai).	
These	puzzles	provide	Aristotle	with	starting	points	for	investigation.	For	an	
account	of	Aristotle’s	dialectical	method	in	NE 7.1–2,	see	Cooper	(2009).
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Socrates’	account	of	uncontrolled	actions.	In	the	chapter,	this	claim	is	
anticipated	and	reflected	in	Aristotle’s	repeated	insistence	that	acting	
against	 actively	held	knowledge	would	be	unintelligible,	describing	
such	 (impossible)	cases	as	 terrible	 (deinon)	 (1146b34) 8	and	astonish-
ing	(thaumaston)	(1147a9–10).9	Similarly,	when	Aristotle	introduces	his	
well-known	pattern	for	explanation	of	action	(practical	syllogism)	at	
1147a24–31,	he	asserts	 that	once	 its	 two	premises,	 the	universal	one	
(representing	 the	 agent’s	 decision	 or	 desire)	 and	 the	 particular	 one	
(representing	 the	agent’s	knowledge	or	awareness	of	 the	salient	 fea-
tures	of	her	situation),	are	put	together,	 the	agent	necessarily	and im-
mediately	asserts	and	believes	the	conclusion	or,	in	the	case	of	beliefs	
about	doing	things,	necessarily	and	immediately	acts	(1147a26–8).10
Aristotle	is	thus	committed	to	the	view	that	one	cannot	act	against	
one’s	actively	held	knowledge	(or	beliefs)11	while	one	is	aware	that	the	
knowledge	applies	to	one’s	situation.	But	he	makes	it	equally	obvious	
(in	NE 7.3	and	elsewhere)	that	he	thinks	that	uncontrolled	actions	(un-
derstood	as	actions	against	one’s	knowledge)	exist:	the	uncontrolled	
agent	is	one	who	acts	on	her	non-rational	desire	and	against	her	deci-
sion	(prohairesis).12 
8.	 That	the	meaning	of	deinon	in	NE 7.3	is	“terrible	because	impossible”	is	clear	
from	NE 7.2,	1145b23,	where	Aristotle	uses	it	—	in	reporting	Socrates’	view	that	
acting	against	one’s	knowledge	is	impossible	—	to	express	the	idea	of	impos-
sibility.	A	similar	use	of	deinon	can	be	found	in	Plato’s	Theaetetus at	184d.	See	
Burnyeat	(1976,	30).
9.	 That	the	meaning	of	thaumaston	(which	can	simply	mean	puzzling	without	
any	implication	about	the	intelligibility	of	what	 is	puzzling)	 is	“astonishing	
because	impossible”	is	clear	from	its	correlation	with	atopon	(absurd)	in	the	
same	sentence.
10.	A	different	 interpretation	of	the	passage,	according	to	which	the	agent	can	
fail	 to	 act	 even	when	 she	 puts	 the	 two	 premises	 together,	 is	 defended	 by	
Charles	(1984,	128–32).	I	discuss	his	view	in	section	3	below.	
11.	 One	needs	to	keep	in	mind	that	although	Aristotle	continues	to	speak	about	
knowledge,	the	puzzle	arises	on	his	view	equally	with	belief.	His	argument	is	
meant	to	apply	to	actions	against	both	knowledge	and	belief	(1146b25–32).
12.	 See	NE 3.2,	1111b13–5;	7.8,	1151a6–7.	In	NE 7.3,	the	term	“decision”	(prohairesis) 
comes	 up	 in	 the	 opening	 passage	 at	 1146b22–4,	where	Aristotle	 character-
izes	the	distinction	between	the	intemperate	(akolastos)	and	the	uncontrolled	
by	pleasure	(NE 7.1,	1145b12–4).5	And	there	is	Socrates’	view	according	
to	which	it	is	impossible	to	act	against	knowledge.6	Consequently,	it	is	
impossible	to	perform	an	action	that	one	knows	is	bad	when	one	has	
(and	knows	that	one	has)	some	other,	better	action,	available	(NE 7.2,	
1145b23–7).	Since,	on	 this	view,	knowledge	cannot	be	overcome,	an	
uncontrolled	action	is	done	out	of	ignorance	of	the	true	value	of	the	
pleasure	at	which	 the	action	aims.	These	 two	views	contradict	each	
other	insofar	as	one	of	them	holds,	while	the	other	one	denies,	that	
the	uncontrolled	agent	acts	knowingly	when	she	acts	without	control.7 
Aristotle’s	 solution	 to	 the	 puzzle	 is,	 however,	 less	 clear	 than	 his	
statement	of	it.	Perhaps	the	most	striking	difficulty	concerns	Aristotle’s	
claim,	at	the	very	end	of	NE 7.3	(1147b13–7),	that	his	solution	preserves	
5.	 This	view	is	characterized	as	being	that	of	ordinary	people	(or,	rather,	of	“the	
many”)	by	Plato	at	Prot. 352b–c.	But	it	is	also	a	view	expressed,	for	example,	
by	Euripides.	Thus	Medea	says:	 “I	understand	 the	evil	deed	 I	 am	about	 to	
commit,	but	my	passion	(thumos),	the	cause	of	the	greatest	evils	that	men	do, 
is	stronger	than	the	purposes	of	my	deliberate	thoughts	(bouleumatōn)”	(Me-
dea 1078–80).	
6.	 This	view	is	articulated	by	Socrates	in	Plato’s	Protagoras at	358c–d.
7.	 The	puzzle	cannot	arise,	as	 it	 is	often	 taken	 to	arise,	merely	 from	Socrates’	
own	position	being	contradictory	to	phainomena understood	as	some	given	
facts	of	experience	since	Socrates’	position	is	an	explanation	of	that	experi-
ence.	In	the	Protagoras, Socrates	is	not	denying	that	there	is	a	certain	kind	of	
experience	people	have	that	they	call	 “being	weaker	than	oneself”	(to hēttō 
einai hautou)	(Prot. 358c)	wherein	people	fail	to	do	the	best	thing	available	to	
them	while	knowing	or	believing	(Prot. 358c–d)	(although	perhaps	only	be-
forehand)	that	it	is	available	to	them:	“Come	with	me	then	to	try	to	persuade	
people	and	 to	 teach	 them	what	 is	 this	experience	 (pathos)	which	 they	call	
being	overcome	by	pleasures	and	because	of	which	they	fail	to	do	the	best	
things,	when	they	know	what	they	are”	(Prot. 352e4–353a3).	Rather,	Socrates	
denies	 the	 truth	of	a	particular	kind	of	explanation	of	 this	experience	 that	
suggests	 that	 people	 act	 so	 because	 they	 (i. e.,	 their	 knowledge	 or	 beliefs)	
have	 been	 overcome	 by	 pleasure.	Aristotle’s	 own	 interpretation	 of	 Socrates’	
position	as	denying	that	there	is	 lack	of	control	needs	to	be	understood	in	
this	light,	i. e.,	as	denying	that	people	are	ever	overcome	by	pleasure	in	that	
way.	When	he	says	that	Socrates’	view	“manifestly	contradicts	the	phenom-
ena,”	the	phenomena in	question	just	are	the	views	about	the	nature	of	lack	of	
control	he	has	already	mentioned	in	NE 7.1,	and	not	any	obvious	facts	about	
how	things	are.	On	this	point,	see	Owen	(1967)	and	Cooper	(1999).	For	a	view	
that	constructs	the	puzzle	(including	Socrates’	own	position	in	the	Protagoras)	
differently,	see	Corcilius	(2008).
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has	when	one	believes,	and	takes	oneself	to	have	a	reason to	believe,	
that	something	is	good	for	oneself	(NE 3.4,	1113b23–7).	Decisions	are	
thus	 conative	psychological	 states	 that	 are	expressive	of	 the	agent’s	
sincerely	held	beliefs	 or	 knowledge	of	what	 is	 good	 and	bad.	They	
carry	rational	conviction	(pistis)15	and	exhibit	what	Aristotle	calls	the	
strength	or	vehemence	of	supposition	(sphodrotēs hupolēpseōs).16	One	
can	usefully	conceive	of	them	as	sincere	resolutions	or	commitments	
to	action	that	one	has	made	with	full	knowledge	or	understanding	of	
why	one	does	them.
The	 problem	of	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 is	 that	 although	 she	 has	
made	her	decision	and	 is	 convinced	about	 the	course	of	action	 she	
has	decided	for,	when	the	time	comes,	she	 fails	 to	stick	 to	 it	and	 in-
stead	does	something	else	—	typically	the	very	thing	that	she	decided	
not	 to	do.	One	could	attempt	 to	solve	 the	problem	by	claiming	that	
people	who	act	in	this	way	retract	their	previous	decisions,	and	hav-
ing	changed	their	minds,	make	a	new	one.	But	this	kind	of	solution	
does	not	work	 for	Aristotle:	 it	would	 require	 him	 to	 change	 the	 as-
sumption	that	uncontrolled	people	can	and	do	have	 full	knowledge	
or	understanding	of	why	they	should	act	in	the	way	they	decided	to	
act.17	Only	if	their	knowledge	were	in	some	sense	incomplete,	would	it	
make	sense	to	think	that	they	could	have	come	to	see	something	(say,	
some	pleasure)	as	a	reason	for	changing	their	minds.	The	assumption	
of	full	knowledge,	however,	requires	that	no	such	further	reasons,	as	
not	know	explicitly	in	what	way	it	does	so).	For	an	overview	of	the	different	
interpretations	of	wish	 (including	views	 that	oppose	accounts	 that	ground	
wish	in	eudaimonia),	see	Pearson	(2012,	141–67).
15. Pistis (conviction)	 is	 tied	 to	 persuasion	 by	 reasoning	 (DA	 428a16–24).	 As	
Aristotle	says:	“Some	people	are	convinced	about	what	they	believe	no	less	
than	others	about	what	they	know”	(1146b29–30).	See	also	EE 2.10,	1226b21–
30.	This	 is	why	Aristotle	 remarks	 that	 it	does	not	matter	whether	 the	state	
(which	one	should	not	be	able	to	act	against)	amounts	to	knowledge	or	belief	
(1146b24–31).
16.	 Here	I	follow	Burnet (1900,	299).	See	Top. 4.5,	126b25–7.	
17.	 See	NE 7.1,	1145b10–4;	7.8,	1151a20–9.
It	is	significant	that	Aristotle	conceives	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	as	
acting	against	her	decision	rather	than	mere	judgment.	Decisions	are	
not	mere	prescriptions	or	thoughts	about	what	one	should	do.	They	
are	desires13	that	result	from	successful	deliberation	(NE	3.3,	1113a2–5;	
6.2,	1139a23; EE	2.10,	1226b17)	about	what	action	would	best	promote	
an	end	that	 is	desired	in	virtue	of	 its	being	conceived	of	as	good	by	
the	 agent.	An	end	of	 this	 sort	 is	 the	object	 of	 a	 rational	 kind	of	de-
sire	 that	Aristotle	calls	wish	 (boulēsis).14	Wish	 is	a	desire,	which	one	
agent	in	terms	of	decision:	the	intemperate	agent	does,	whereas	the	uncon-
trolled	does	not,	decide	to	pursue	the	pleasure	at	hand.	That	the	uncontrolled	
agent	does	not	decide	to	do	so	is	obvious	to	Aristotle	from	the	fact	that	he	
does	not	 think	or	 believe	 that	 he	 should	pursue	 it.	Note	 that	 believing	or	
thinking	that	one	should	do	something	is	here	treated	as	a	necessary	condi-
tion	for	deciding	to	do	it.
13.	 Some	 commentators	 deny	 that	 prohairesis is	 a	 desire.	 For	 example,	 Sarah	
Broadie	 has	 argued	 that	 decision	 “as	 such	 does	 not	 carry	 an	 inherent	 psy-
chological	power	or	forceful	tendency	to	suppress	or	push	past	recalcitrant	
elements	within	the	soul”	(Broadie	and	Rowe	[2002,	43]).	On	her	view,	deci-
sion	is	“more	like	a	judgment	than	it	is	like	a	desire”	(Ibid.).	There	is	perhaps	
no	single	passage	which	can	decide	the	issue	but	there	seems	to	be	cumula-
tive	prima facie evidence	for	the	view	that	decision	is	a	desire.	First,	Aristotle	
defines	it	as	a	certain	kind	of	desire,	in	particular	a	“deliberative	desire”	(e. g.,	
NE	6.2,	1139a24)	and	puts	it	on	a	par	with	other	desires	as	something	that	can	
make	an	animal	move	(e. g.,	MA 701a4–5).	Second,	when	he	argues,	in	NE 1.13,	
that	the	human	soul	has	two	distinct	aspects	or	parts,	one	rational	and	one	
non-rational,	he	appeals	to	the	presence	of	two	contrary	impulses	in	the	un-
controlled	agent	(1102b21).	One	of	these	impulses	originates	in	reason	(see,	
for	example,	DA 432b27–33a3,	433b5–10,	434a12–5;	EE 1224a32–b21,	1247b18	
for	the	identification	of	the	reason’s	command	as	an	impulse	or	a	desire)	and,	
in	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent,	 this	 rational	 impulse	 “fights	 against	 and	 resists”	
(1102b14)	the	other	one,	which	comes	from	a	non-rational	source	of	motiva-
tion	(Cf.	Republic 439c–441c).Third,	when	Aristotle	describes	the	case	of	self-
control	at	DA 433a1–5,	he	portrays	the	self-controlled	person	as	acting	(in	this	
case,	resisting)	on	her	thought	against	her	appetite.	The	case	of	self-control	is	
significant,	since	the	issue	turns	on	whether	we	need	to	invoke,	in	explaining	
the	 self-controlled	 agent’s	 action	 of	 resisting	 her	 bad	 desires,	 anything	 be-
sides	her	rational	commitment	or	beliefs.	Aristotle	does	not	appear	to	suggest	
that	we	do	(see	also	note	18	below).	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	issue,	see	
Dahl	(1984,	35–99;	188–200).	
14.	 On	most	 interpretations,	wish	 (or,	 at	 any	 rate,	 the	 virtuous	 person’s	wish)	
is	ultimately	grounded,	in	one	way	or	another,	in	the	agent’s	conception	of	
eudaimonia;	if	something	is	to	be	considered	good	by	the	agent,	it	must	be	the	
case	that	she	thinks	that	it	contributes	to	her	eudaimonia (although	she	need	
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1.2. The problems of interpreting NE 7.3: the exegetical problem
Although	 NE 7.3	 promises	 the	 answer,	 it	 poses	 difficult	 exegetical	
problems	that	make	determining	the	answer	exceedingly	difficult.	The	
core	of	Aristotle’s	discussion	 is	divided	 into	 two	parts:	 the	first	part	
which	runs	from	1146b31	to	1147a24,	and	the	second	part,	which	Aris-
totle	calls	a	“physical”	(phusikōs) account,	and	which	runs	from	1147a24	
to	1147b12.19	In	the	first	part,	Aristotle	introduces	three	ways	in	which	
someone	 can	 have	 but	 not	 use	 knowledge	 in	 action.	 These	 three	
ways	are	introduced	as	objections	to	Socrates’	view	that	while	acting	
without	control,	the	uncontrolled	agent	cannot	be	acting	against	her	
knowledge	and	so	she	must	be	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	what	she	does	
is	wrong,	instead	believing	that	it	is,	at	least	at	the	moment	she	acts,	
the	best	thing	to	do	(NE 7.2,	1145b23–32).	Of	the	third	way	of	having	
but	not	using	knowledge	(1147a10–7)	—	the	way	in	which	people	who	
are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep	have	but	do	not	use	it	—	Aristotle	asserts	that	
it	is	the	way	in	which	the	uncontrolled	agent	has	but	does	not	use	her	
knowledge	while	she	acts	without	control.20	 In	 the	second	part	(the	
physical	account),	Aristotle	makes	use	of	syllogistic	apparatus	with	the	
overt	purpose	of	illuminating	the	causes	of	uncontrolled	action.	The	
Desires	 (whether	 rational	or	non-rational)	are	already	accompanied	by	(or	
involve)	heating	or	chilling	(it	is	in	fact	what	they	in	part	are)	and	that	is	why	
they	can	produce	the	pathē.	Desire	(orexis)	is	already	a	reaching	out	–	it	is	what	
leads	one	from	thought,	phantasia	or	perception	to	the	affection	that	then	ex-
tends	to	an	actual	movement	of	the	limbs.	It	is	important,	in	fact	crucial,	to	
see	that	the	pathē that	are	said	to	prepare	the	organic	parts	for	movement	in	
the	MA are	not	emotions	(such	as	love,	hate,	or	fear)	but,	rather,	alterations	
(701a5,	701b11–32)	in	the	animal	(in	or	around	the	heart)	that	are	productive	
of	the	appropriate	movements.	For	a	discussion	that	is	critical	of	the	kind	of	
view	adopted	(but	not	defended)	here,	see	Corcilius	2008d,	160–207.
19.	 It	is	often	thought	that	since	Aristotle	says	that	the	exposition	in	the	second	
half	of	NE 7.3	contains	a	phusikōs	account,	the	first	part	of	the	chapter	must	
contain	a	logikōs account	even	if	Aristotle	does	not	explicitly	say	so.	I	am	not	
committed	to	the	view	that	the	first	part	of	Aristotle’s	discussion	is	logikōs in	
the	technical	sense	of	the	term.	For	the	contrast	between	phusikōs and	logikōs 
(or	analutikōs)	methods	see	Phys. 264a7,	GC 316a11,	or	DA 403a2.	
20.	The	claim	is	repeated	at	NE 7.10,	1152a14–6.
far	as	they	are	concerned,	exist.	Aristotle’s	uncontrolled	agents	do	not	
change	their	minds	and	neither	do	they	retract	their	decisions.	
But	how	are	we,	then,	to	understand	Aristotle’s	claim	that	the	un-
controlled	 agent	 acts	 against	 her	 decision	 and	on	 a	mere	non-ratio-
nal	desire?	Given	Aristotle’s	own	assumptions,	an	action	of	this	sort	
should	not	be	possible.	The	challenge	of	any	interpretation	lies	in	find-
ing	a	satisfying	answer	to	how,	on	Aristotle’s	account,	an	uncontrolled	
agent	can	both	act	against	her	decision	(or	knowledge)	while knowing	
that	she	should	not	be	doing	that	(1146b31)	and	yet	not	violate	Aristo-
tle’s	claim	that	acting	against	actively	held	knowledge	(i. e.,	decision)	
is	impossible.18
18.	 One	might	wonder	about	the	way	in	which	a	rational	state	(such	as	decision	
or	wish)	can	initiate	(or	prevent)	bodily	movement.	Given	that	Aristotle	tells	
us	 that	what	 is	 required	 for	movement	 is	 some	 form	of	 “heating	and	chill-
ing”	(MA 701a35),	one	might	form	the	view	that	only	non-rational	desires	can	
initiate	movement.	One	might	 think	 this	because	 the	processes	of	heating	
and	chilling	are	connected	with	bodily	pleasures	and	pains	and	these	plea-
sures	 and	pains	 can	 take	 the	 form	of	 various	 affections	or	 feelings	 (pathē).	
Thus	when	Aristotle	tells	us	that	affections	prepare	the	bodily	parts	(702a18)	
which	then	perform	the	actual	movements,	one	might	form	the	view	that	it	
is	only	 the	non-rational	desires	 that	 can	 initiate	actual	movement.	 In	view	
of	this,	one	might	then	further	think	that	decisions	must	be	more	like	mere	
judgments	or	commands	that	have	to	be	carried	out	by	non-rational	desires	
which,	being	receptive	of	such	commands	(although	being	so	receptive	with	
a	varying	degree	of	enthusiasm)	are	in	a	position	to	initiate	the	appropriate	
bodily	movements	(Cf.	MM 2.7,	1206b8–29).	This	is	a	cogent	line	of	thought.	
However,	since	Aristotle’s	distinction	between	rational	and	non-rational	de-
sires	is	a	distinction	between	different	ways	in	which	we	can	come	to	desire	
things	(and	so	between	different	kinds	of	desire	insofar	as	their	intentional	
objects	are	concerned)	but	not	between	different	ways	in	which	desires	(ra-
tional	or	non-rational)	 initiate	movement,	 this	 line	of	 thought	need	not	be	
adopted.	First,	notice	 that	although	a	 rational	desire	 (such	as	a	wish)	 is	or	
can	be	characterized	as	a	desire	without	pain	(Top. 146b2),	this	can	mean	only	
that	it	does	not	arise	from	and	is	not	grounded	in	a	previous	“painful”	state	of	
lack	as	non-rational	desires	are.	Aristotle	never	says	that	it	is	a	desire	whose	
satisfaction	is	without	pleasure.	He	is	in	fact	quite	clear	that	the	rational	plea-
sures	are	real	pleasures	(e. g.,	NE 1168b28–69a8,	EE 1224b16–9),	and	that	they	
are	motivationally	efficacious.	They	are	what	can	make	us	do,	or	refrain	from	
doing,	things	(1175a30–b25).	The	fact	that	they	do	not	involve	restoration	of	
a	bodily	lack	to	some	natural	state	does	not	imply	that	they	do	not	involve	
any	bodily	activities	at	all.	Second,	the	processes	of	heating	or	chilling	which	
are	required	for	the	pathē which	initiate	movement	(MA 702a17–9)	to	occur	
are	produced	by	thought	or	phantasia (701a35,	703b13–5)	and	not by	desire.	
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at	1147a31–5,	the	uncontrolled	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion	(that	
she	should	not	taste).	But	according	to	the	immediately	preceding	pas-
sage	which	 introduces	 the	practical	 syllogism,	 the	agent	 should	not	
draw	the	good	conclusion	because	if	she	had	done	so,	she	would	not	
have	acted	without	control.
	The	second	challenge	is	 that	 in	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	Aris-
totle	clearly	says	(at	1147a33)	that	the	particular	premise	“this	is	sweet”	
is	active.	But	further	down	in	the	chapter	(at	1147b9–12)	he	says	(or	it	
seems	plausible	to	think	that	he	says)	that	it	is	the	particular	premise	
that	the	uncontrolled	agent	either	lacks27	or	does	not	use	when	he	acts	
without	control.	If	both	passages	describe	uncontrolled	action,	it	seems	
that	Aristotle	is	contradicting	himself.	It	also	seems	natural	to	connect	
the	later	passage	(1147b9–12)	with	the	passage	at	1146b35–1147a10	(the	
second	of	the	three	ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge)	accord-
ing	to	which	one	can	act	against	a	universal	premise	or	proposition	if	
one	does	not	have	or	does	not	use	one’s	knowledge	of	the	particular	
proposition.	On	the	basis	of	 these	two	passages,	one	may	well	 think	
that	Aristotle	 suggests,	 despite	 the	 contradictory	 appearances	 in	 the	
“two-syllogism”	 passage,	 that	while	 acting	without	 control	 the	 agent	
does	not	have	or	is	not	using	the	relevant	particular	premise.	
1.3. The main interpretative strategies 
The	interpretative	strategies28	that	have	been	explored	in	the	literature	
divide	according	to	whether	they	do	or	do	not	allow	the	uncontrolled	
two	 competing	 practical	 syllogisms:	 one	 good	 (representing	 the	 decision)	
and	one	bad	(representing	the	uncontrolled	action).	I	am	not	committed	to	
the	view	that	there	are	in	fact	two	distinct	practical	syllogisms	described	in	
the	passage.
27.	 Some	scholars	have	argued	that	the	“last	proposition”	refers	to	the	conclusion	
of	the	practical	syllogism,	rather	than	to	the	particular	premise.	I	discuss	the	
issue	in	section	3.
28.	The	brief	overview	of	interpretations	of	NE 7.3	that	follows	is	not	meant	to	be	
an	exhaustive	discussion	of	the	literature	on	Aristotle’s	theory	of	lack	of	con-
trol.	Given	the	number	of	interpretations	available	as	well	as	the	complexity	
and	difficulty	of	the	issues,	philosophical	and	exegetical,	involved,	such	dis-
cussion	is	not	possible	within	the	constraints	of	a	single	article.
problem	is	that	it	is	neither	clear	how	the	two	parts	are	related	to	each	
other,	nor	what	the	theory	(or	theories)	in	each	of	them	is.	
Some	scholars	have	taken	at	its	face	value	Aristotle’s	claim,	in	the	
first	part	of	the	chapter,	that	the	uncontrolled	person’s	state	of	mind	is	
like	that	of	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep,	but	concluded	that	
it	leads	to	an	implausible	theory	since	it	would	mean	that	the	uncon-
trolled	agent’s	mind	is	clouded.	David	Bostock	describes	it	in	the	fol-
lowing	way:	the	“desire	or	other	emotion	involved	simply	blocks	one’s	
ability	to	take	in	and	keep	in	mind	the	relevant	facts.”21	Some	scholars	
have	accepted	that	this	is	Aristotle’s	view,	but	concluded,	along	with	
Bostock,	that	it	is	“a	wholly	incredible	account”22	since	it	reduces	un-
controlled	actions	to	outbursts	of	uncontrollable	emotions.23	As	they	
saw	it,	such	“general	obfuscation”24	of	the	mind	would	entirely	under-
mine	the	claim	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows	what	she	is	doing	in	
any	(still	plausible)	way	at	all.
Most	scholars	have	thus	focused	on	the	physical	account,	treating	
the	previously	introduced	three	ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowl-
edge	as	mere	preliminary	distinctions.25	The	problem	is	that	the	physi-
cal	account	appears	inconsistent.	It	describes	the	state	of	mind	of	the	
uncontrolled	agent	by	means	of	a	practical	syllogism	which	Aristotle	
introduces	at	1147a24–31.	The	first	challenge	is	that	according	to	the	
central	passage	of	the	account,	the	so-called	“two-syllogism”26	passage	
21.	 Bostock	(2000,	127).
22.	 Ibid.
23.	 See	Austin	(1979,	198)	for	an	example	of	an	interpretation	of	Aristotle	(and	
Plato)	along	these	lines.
24.	Kenny	(1966).	
25.	 The	traditional	view	has	been	to	see	them	as	the	first	three	of	the	gradually	
more	refined	solutions,	so	that	only	the	physical	account	is	in	fact	the	actual	
solution.	See,	for	example,	Gauthier	and	Jolif (1970,	605);	Joachim	(1955,	223);	
and	Robinson	(1969,	141).	A	similar	approach	has	been	recently	championed	
by	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008).	An	alternative	proposal	(one	more	akin	to	
the	interpretation	I	argue	for	in	this	paper)	has	been	put	forward	by	Corcilius	
(2008a),	who	argues	that	the	first	part	is	concerned	with	knowledge	of	the	
uncontrolled	agent	whereas	the	second	part	with	the	uncontrolled	action.	
26.	 I	call	it	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	because	it	has	been	thought	to	contain	
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particular	premise	with	one	universal	premise	but	fail	 to	use	it	with	
another,	given	that	she	is	supposed	to	be	actively	attending	to	all	the	
premises	in	question.31	These	two	versions	of	the	first	strategy	are	thus	
exegetically	difficult,	since	the	former	has	to	postulate	the	presence	of	
an	additional	premise,32	and	the	latter	has	to	appeal	to	the	ability	of	
appetites	to	selectively	hijack	premises	away	from	reason’s	(although	
not	the	agent’s)	awareness.33 
31.	 There	are	a	number	of	similar	interpretations,	each	with	significant	individu-
al	variations.	For	some	of	the	classic	versions,	see	Joachim	(1955,	228);	Hardie	
(1981,	258–93);	and	Gauthier	and	Jolif	(2002,	602–17).
32.	Gosling	 (1990,	33–7)	also	argues	 that	 the	uncontrolled	agent	 fails	 to	use	a	
particular	premise,	but	it	is	not	the	particular	premise	“this	is	sweet”	(which	
is	needed	to	draw	the	good	conclusion)	but,	rather,	the	other	particular	prem-
ise	distinguished	earlier	at	NE	7.3,	1146b35–1147a10	that	concerns	the	agent	
and	 that	 is	also	needed	 if	one	 is	 to	act	according	 to	 the	universal	premise.	
The	agent	 fails	 to	 realize	 that	she	 is	 the	sort	of	person	whom	the	decision	
concerns	 since	appetite	makes	 the	agent	 forget	 that.	The	upshot	 is	 that	 al-
though	 the	 agent	may	 perfectly	well	 know	 all	 the	 good	 premises	 and	 the	
good	conclusion,	they	lose	any	practical	import	for	him.	I	may	know	that	one	
should	not	eat	 sweets	 (and	 so	one	 should	not	eat	 the	 sweets	 that	 I	 see	 in	
front	of	me)	but	that	would	only	apply	to	me	if	I	was	interested	in	my	health.	
In	 the	uncontrolled	action	my	appetite	makes	me	temporarily	 lose	 interest	
in	health	(or	forget	that	I	am	interested	in	it)	and	so	I	will	take	some	sweets	
while	still	being	perfectly	well	aware	of	my	previous	reasoning.	Gosling’s	so-
lution	faces	various	problems.	First,	if	I	drink	wine	despite	my	decision	not	
to	drink	wine	when	driving	because	I	am	currently	unaware	of	the	fact	that	
I	am	the	driver,	then	it	is	not	clear	why	my	action	is	not	to	be	classified	as	a	
case	of	absentmindedness	rather	than	of	lack	of	control	(see	my	discussion	of	
1146b35–47a10	below).	Second,	why	would	the	agent	be	thinking	(other	than	
by	 chance)	of	 the	universal	premise	 (as	 the	physical	 account	 suggests	 she	
does),	if	she	does	not	know	or	has	forgotten	that	it	applies	to	her?	
33.	 Sarah	Broadie	attempts	 to	deal	with	 this	problem	by	proposing	 that	 in	NE 
7.3	the	expressions	“knowledge	is	used”	and	“knowledge	is	active”	(or	“con-
templated”)	 are	 not	 interchangeable	 (Broadie	 and	 Rowe	 [54–57;	 391–94]).	
She	interprets	“used”	as	meaning	“used	as	it	should	be	used,”	and	“active”	as	
meaning	“to	be	acted	upon.”	Hence,	when	at	1147a33	Aristotle	says	that	“this	
is	 sweet”	 is	 active,	 it	 is	 still	 an	open	question	whether	 it	 is	 also	used	as	 it	
should	be	used.	In	fact,	it	is	not	used	as	it	should	be	used	since	the	agent	acts	
wrongly	upon	it	(instead	of	avoiding	the	sweet,	she	goes	for	it).	But	this	inter-
pretation	cannot	be	supported	by	the	text	NE 7.3.	When	drawing	the	first	dis-
tinction	between	having	and	using	and	having	but	not	using	one’s	knowledge	
(1146b31–35),	Aristotle	switches	freely	from	“use”	(chrēsthai)	to	“contemplate”	
(theōrein)	and	the	text	gives	no	incentive	to	interpret	“contemplate”	otherwise	
agent	to	draw	the	good	conclusion.	According	to	the	first	strategy,	the	
uncontrolled	agent	fails	to	draw	the	good	conclusion	since,	if	she	did,	
she	would	not	have	acted	without	control.	Because	Aristotle	says	that	
an	agent	must	draw	the	conclusion	when	both	the	universal	and	the	
particular	premises	are	present,	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	failure	to	do	
so	 is	generally	explained	by	her	 failure	 to	grasp,	or	actively	hold	 in	
mind,	one	of	the	relevant	premises.	In	other	words,	the	cause	of	the	
uncontrolled	action	 is	 to	be	 located	 in	a	cognitive	 failure.	The	 tradi-
tional	approach	has	been	to	argue	that	the	agent	fails	to	grasp	the	par-
ticular	premise.29
All	 interpretations	based	on	this	strategy	run	into	a	similar	set	of	
problems.	First,	they	need	to	explain	why	the	particular	premise	is	said	
to	be	active	in	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	and,	in	fact,	the	agent	ap-
pears	to	be	drawing	the	good	conclusion.	One	solution	is	to	argue	that	
the	active	premise	is	not	the	one	leading	to	the	good	conclusion,	but	
to	the	bad	one	(i. e.,	there	are	in	fact	two	particular	premises,	although	
only	one	of	 them	is	mentioned	explicitly).30	The	uncontrolled	agent	
acts	as	 she	does,	because	she	 is	 solely	 focused	on	 the	attractive	 fea-
ture	of	what	she	desires,	ignoring	or	not	being	aware	that	the	object	
also	has	a	feature	that	made	her	decide	against	it.	The	problem	is	that	
it	 seems	perfectly	 conceivable	 that	 one	 can	be	 attracted	 and	not	 at-
tracted	to	the	same	thing	in	the	very	same	respect.	One	may	have	an	
appetite	for	deep-fried	things,	precisely	because	their	being	deep-fried	
makes	them	pleasant	to	eat.	But	one	may	have	also	decided	not	to	eat	
deep-fried	things	because	they	are	unhealthy.	It	is	mysterious	how	one	
could	notice	that	something	is	pleasant	but	not	that	it	is	unhealthy,	if	it	
is	perceived	to	be	both	precisely	in	virtue	of	its	being	deep-fried.
Another	 solution	 has	 been	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 premise	 is	 active,	
but	not	 in	 relation	 to	one’s	decision,	but	only	 to	one’s	appetite,	hav-
ing	been	“hijacked”	by	it.	One	problem	with	a	view	along	these	lines	
is	 that	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 can	 use	 the	 same	
29.	Examples	include:	Price	(2006);	Grgić	(2002);	Gosling	(1990);	Mele	(1985).
30.	For	a	classic	statement	of	this	view,	see	Robinson	(1969).	
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or	fickleness.	Another	problem	concerns	 the	way	 in	which	appetite	
is	supposed	to	make	the	agent	forget	her	decision.	One	way	in	which	
it	 could	do	so	 is	by	making	 the	agent	 ignore	 the	 relevant	particular	
premise.36	But	then,	similarly	to	the	preceding	case,	we	need	an	expla-
nation	of	how	appetite	can	make	one	unaware	of	some	feature	of	one’s	
situation	 if	 that	 feature	 could	 just	have	 served	as	 the	basis	of	 one’s	
deliberation	and	decision.
All	interpretations	based	on	the	first	strategy	solve	the	problem	of	
how	an	uncontrolled	agent	can	both	act	against	her	knowledge	while 
knowing	that	she	is	doing	so	and	yet	not	violate	the	dictum	that	acting	
against	actively	held	knowledge	is	impossible	by	making	the	agent	ig-
norant	(in	one	way	or	another)	of	the	fact	that,	at	the	moment	she	acts,	
she	 is	 acting	 against	 her	 knowledge.	Although	 this	 is	 a	 possible	 ac-
count	of	uncontrolled	actions,	it	comes	too	close	to	the	Socratic	denial	
of	uncontrolled	actions	and	moves	too	far	away	from	Aristotle’s	claim	
that	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows,	even	if	only	in a way,	that	what	she	
does	is	wrong	(1152a14–6).
The	second	strategy	tries	to	avoid	this	problem	by	arguing	that	al-
though	the	agent	knows	that	she	is	acting	in	that	way,	her	knowledge	is	
somehow	not	full-fledged:	it	is,	one	might	say,	merely	theoretical.	The	
failure	is	thus	motivational	rather	than	cognitive.	This	strategy	begins	
by	arguing	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion	(i. e.,	
she	does	not	lack	any	of	the	premises)	but	that,	despite	doing	so,	she	
does	not	act	on	it.	Interpretations	along	these	lines	have	an	easier	time	
explaining	the	content	of	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	since	they	can	
take	it	at	face	value.37	But	they	face	another	problem	—	why	does	the	
agent	not	act	on	her	conclusion?	One	prominent	interpretation	claims	
that	it	is	because	her	mode	of	holding	that	conclusion	is	in	some	way	
36.	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008,	335).
37.	 However,	they	then	have	to	argue	that	Aristotle	is	not	committed	to	the	view	
that	if	the	agent	has	and	actively	attends	to	both	premises	then	he	must	nec-
essarily	 act	on	 them,	as	 the	passage	preceding	 the	 “two-syllogism”	passage	
appears	to	claim	(1147a24–31).	I	discuss	this	passage	in	section	3.
Even	in	putting	these	issues	aside,	however,	there	are	two	difficult	
problems	that	tend	to	undermine	most,	if	not	all,	interpretations	along	
these	 lines.	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 viable	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 uncon-
trolled	agent	suddenly	becomes	unaware	or	unable	 to	grasp	 the	 rel-
evant	premise	—	especially	since	it	is	quite	possible	(as	well	as	highly	
probable)	 that	 the	 agent	 has	made	 her	 decision	 (i. e.,	 the	 universal	
premise	—	say,	not	to	eat	sweets)	in	view	of	her	awareness	that	there	
are	 some	sweets	available	 (i. e.,	 the	particular	premise).	Second,	 the	
lack	of	the	relevant	particular	premise	threatens	to	render	the	uncon-
trolled	action	involuntary:	if	the	agent	does	not	know	or	is	not	aware	
that	the	object	she	wants	(or	the	action	she	is	to	take)	has	the	feature	
that	made	her	decide	against	it	(say,	being	sweet),	then	her	engaging	in	
the	action	under	that	description	(say,	eating	sweets)	is	not	voluntary.34
In	 view	of	 these	problems,	 a	 recent	 approach,	developed	by	 Jen-
nifer	Whiting	and	Martin	Pickavé,	 takes	 the	cognitive	 failure	 to	con-
cern	the	universal	proposition	(i. e.,	the	agent’s	decision)	rather	than	
the	particular	one.35	On	their	view,	the	agent’s	appetite	impedes	her	
knowledge	of	the	universal	belief	prohibitive	of	the	uncontrolled	ac-
tion.	She	consequently	does	not	or	perhaps	cannot	bring	this	knowl-
edge	from	the	first	to	the	second	actuality	and	so	is	unable	to	refrain	
from	the	action.	In	other	words,	the	agent	temporarily	forgets	about	
her	 decision	 on	 account	 of	 her	 appetite.	One	 problem	with	 this	 in-
terpretation	 is	 that	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 does	 not	 act	 against	 her	
decision	in	the	way	in	which	her	action	would	qualify	as	a	case	of	lack	
of	control	—	as	opposed	to,	for	example,	a	case	of	mere	forgetfulness,	
than	 as	 an	 alternative	 expression	 for	 “use.”	 In	 the	 next	 passage	 (1146b35–
1147a7),	Aristotle	 says	 that	 it	 is	not	 strange	 to	act	against	one’s	knowledge	
(i. e.,	one’s	universal	premise)	when	not	using	the	particular	premise	that	goes	
with	it	(1147a2–3).	After	giving	an	example	of	the	premise	(“this	here	is	such	
and	such”)	he	says	that	the	agent	either	does	not	have	or	does	not	activate 
(energein)	it	(1147a7).	It	is	quite	clear	that	“activate”	and	“use”	are	used	inter-
changeably	in	this	passage.
34.	One	could	take	the	view	that	the	uncontrolled	action	is	involuntary,	but	this	
is	not	Aristotle’s	view	(1152a14–6).	
35.	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008).
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out	 control,	 is	 in	possession	of	her	 knowledge	but	 she	 is	unable	 to	
use	it	as knowledge	due	to	the	temporary	disablement	of	her	reason	
by	appetite	(I	will	explain	this	in	section	2).	In	this	sense,	she	knows	
but	also	does	not	know	(1147a14–5).	Although	the	inability	to	use	her	
knowledge	as knowledge	has	little	impact	on	her	ability	to	act	in	gen-
eral,	it	does	inhibit	her	ability	to	be	motivated	to	act	by	her	knowledge	
(and	so	by	her	own	decisions).	Second,	I	argue	that	the	physical	dis-
cussion	provides	an	analysis	of	the	particular mental	state	from	which	
the	uncontrolled	action	 issues.	The	 “two-syllogism”	passage	 (NE 7.3,	
1147a31–5)	is	a	description	of	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	state	of	mind	be-
fore	the	uncontrolled	action	and	not,	as	it	has	been	traditionally	under-
stood,	a	description	of	her	state	of	mind	during	the	uncontrolled	action.	
Understood	this	way,	 the	 two	parts	of	NE 7.3	are	answers	 to	 two	
different	questions.	The	first	part	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	
about	the	possibility	of	uncontrolled	behavior	in	light	of	Aristotle’s	as-
sumptions	about	the	impossibility	of	acting	against	one’s	knowledge	
or	decision.	The	second	part	identifies	the	local	or	immediate	causes	
of	uncontrolled	action	(appetitive	desire	and	perception	of	something	
that	 would	 satisfy	 it)	 as	 they	 must	 be	 present	 in	 the	 uncontrolled	
agent’s	mind	 before	 the	 uncontrolled	 action	 occurs	 (i. e.,	 before	 the	
agent	slips	into	the	state	in	which	he	acts	without	control).	Aristotle	
needs	both	accounts	to	capture	the	uncontrolled	agent	since	neither	
the	account	of	her	state	of	mind	during	the	uncontrolled	action	nor	
of	her	state	of	mind	before	it	are	distinctive	of	her	(the	former	applies	
also	to	other	agents,	such	as	those	who	are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep,	and	
the	latter	applies	also	to	self-controlled	agents).	This	explains	the	pres-
ence	of	both	accounts	in	the	chapter	(assigning	them	distinctive	and	
important	 roles)	 and	 avoids	 the	 various	 exegetical	 problems	 I	 have	
mentioned	above.
Third,	 I	 argue	 that	Aristotle	does	not,	 in	NE 7.3,	offer	an	account	
of	the	transition	from	the	state	before	the	uncontrolled	action	(i. e.,	a	
other	texts	and	passages	to	which	Aristotle	alludes	in	NE 7.3.	As	Myles	Burn-
yeat	(2002,	31–2)	remarks,	the	cross-references	in	Aristotle’s	works	can	offer	
“guidance	as	to	how	a	particular	stretch	of	a	writing	should	be	read.”
“off-color.” 38 She	draws	the	good	conclusion,	but	lacks	the	motivation	
to	carry	it	out.
The	problem	with	this	interpretation	is	that	it	works	well	as	a	char-
acterization	of	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	general	condition	but	not	as	
an	explanation	of	her	uncontrolled	action.	The	uncontrolled	agent’s	
knowledge	seems	to	be	“off-color”	all	the	time,	not	only	on	the	specif-
ic	occasion	of	the	uncontrolled	action,	since	not	all	her	desires	reflect	
her	knowledge	of	what	is	best	for	her	to	do.	But	NE 7.3	makes	clear	
that	the	general	condition	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	not	sufficient	
to	explain	particular	uncontrolled	actions:	it	tells	us	that	during	the	
uncontrolled	action,	the	agent	is	in	some	abnormal	or	impaired	cog-
nitive	 condition	 from	which	 condition	 the	 agent	 recovers	 after	 the	
uncontrolled	action	(1147b6–9).39
1.4. The main theses
In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	three	main	theses.	First,	I	argue	that	the	first	
part	of	NE 7.3	(the	so-called	“logical”	account)	 is	not	a	mere	prelimi-
nary	stage	in	Aristotle’s	investigation	but	that	it	contains	the	descrip-
tion	 of	 the	 overall state	 of	mind	of	 the	 agent	while she	 acts	without	
control.	The	core	of	Aristotle’s	solution	lies	in	an	analogy	between	the	
uncontrolled	agent	and	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep,	which,	
however,	does	not	commit	Aristotle	to	the	view	that	the	uncontrolled	
agent’s	state	of	mind	is	clouded	or	unclear	in	the	way	in	which	it	has	
been	thought	to	do	so	in	the	literature.	But	in	order	to	reconstruct	the	
precise	point	of	the	analogy,	one	needs	to	follow	the	trail	of	the	vari-
ous	non-standard	cognitive	states	of	mind	in	Aristotle’s	psychological	
writings.40	As	 it	 turns	out,	 the	uncontrolled	agent,	while	acting	with-
38.	The	best	example	of	this	interpretation	is	developed	in	Charles	(1984,	109–
160).	See	also	Charles	(2009)	and	Dahl	(1984).
39.	One	possibility	would	be	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 agent’s	 knowledge	or	 decision	
becomes	 “off-color”	only	on	 the	 relevant	occasion.	But	 then	 there	must	be	
something	that	explains	what	made	it	“off-color”	at	that	time	in	the	first	place.	
In	other	words,	pointing	to	the	“off-color”	nature	of	the	knowledge	at	the	time	
of	the	action	is	a	way	of	describing	the	phenomenon,	but	not	of	explaining	it.
40.	My	interpretation	relies	on	connecting	the	textual	evidence	in	the	chapter	to	
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does	is	wrong,	believing	that	it	is,	at	least	at	the	moment	she	acts,	the	
best	thing	to	do	(NE 7.2,	1145b23–32).
According	to	 the	first	way	(1146b30–5),	one	can	act	against	one’s	
knowledge	that	what	one	does	is	bad	provided	one	fails	to	use	or	at-
tend	to	it	at	the	relevant	time.	Here	is	an	example:	Vrinda	decides	not	
to	drink	wine	at	a	party	because,	once	the	party	is	over,	she	has	to	drive	
a	car.	But	she	gets	so	caught	up	in	a	conversation	that	she	absentmind-
edly	pours	herself	a	glass	of	wine	and	drinks	it,	not	realizing	that	she	
does	what	she	decided	she	would	not	do.	Her	mind	was	too	intent	on	
the	current	activity	and	so	she	failed	to	make	the	appropriate	connec-
tion.	Socrates’	view	needs	to	be	modified	to	accommodate	cases	of	this	
sort:	it	is	impossible	to	act	against	one’s	knowledge,	unless	one	does	
not	use	or	attend	to	the	knowledge	at	the	time	one	acts.	However,	this	
distinction	is	compatible	with	the	view	that	uncontrolled	action	is	im-
possible.	One	could	maintain	that	if	Vrinda	were	not	absent-minded	
and	attended	to	the	fact	that	what	she	is	about	to	drink	is	wine,	she	
would	not	have	poured	herself	 a	 glass.	And	 if	 she	poured	herself	 a	
glass	without	being	absent-minded,	 this	could	be	best	explained	by	
her	re-evaluating	her	original	decision.
According	 to	 the	 second	way	 (1146b35–47a10),	 one	 can	 even	 act	
against	knowledge	that	one	uses	or	attends	to	at	the	time	one	acts.	Ar-
istotle	distinguishes	between	two	different	kinds	of	propositions	(pro-
taseis)	that	are	operative	in	one’s	action.41	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	
universal	propositions	that	represent	one’s	knowledge	or	beliefs	about	
what	one	 thinks	 is	 good	or	bad	 to	do	 (and	 so	 also	one’s	decisions),	
such	as	one’s	belief	that	drinking	is	impermissible	for	those	who	drive.	
On	the	other	hand,	there	are	particular	propositions,	which	represent	
one’s	knowledge	or	awareness	of	various	particular	 facts	relevant	 to	
41.	 Aristotle	sometimes	distinguishes	propositions	(protaseis) that	serve	as	prem-
ises	 from	those	that	are	 the	conclusions	 from	those	premises	and	uses	 the	
term	protasis (as	opposed	to	sumperasma)	to	refer	to	the	premises	in	those	con-
texts.	As	nothing	in	what	I	say	depends	on	whether	we	translate	protasis as	
premise	or	proposition,	I	continue	to	use	both	terms	as	translations	of	protasis, 
depending	on	what	seems	the	best	in	the	context.	See	Charles	(1984,	120)	for	
a	discussion	of	this	problem.
state	in	which	the	agent	is	still	sticking	to	her	decision	and	resisting	
the	uncontrolled	desire)	to	the	state	in	which	she	already	acts	without	
control.	In	other	words,	he	does	not	explain	what	tips	the	scales	and	
prompts the	 agent	 to	 succumb	 to	 the	 non-rational	 desire.	However,	
in	referring	the	reader	to	“physiologists”	(1147b9)	for	this	account,	he	
provides	 us	with	 a	 vital	 clue	 to	 understand	what	 his	 account	 is	 (or	
would	be)	and	why	it	is	not	present	in	his	discussion	of	uncontrolled	
action	in	EN.	In	particular,	the	account	does	not	involve	any	psycho-
logical	state	that	would	constitute	the	agent’s	choice	to	abandon	her	
decision	and	give	in	to	her	desires.	The	transition	proceeds	on	a	purely	
physiological	level.
	The	structure	of	the	paper	is	as	follows.	In	section	2,	I	discuss	the	
first	part	(1146b31–47a24)	of	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	uncontrolled	ac-
tion	in	NE 7.3	in	which	Aristotle	introduces	three	ways	of	knowing	but	
not	using	one’s	knowledge.	 I	argue	 that	 the	 third	way	 is	 the	clue	 to	
Aristotle’s	 theory	of	 the	state	of	mind	of	 the	uncontrolled	agent	dur-
ing	her	uncontrolled	action.	In	section	3,	I	discuss	the	“physical”	part 
of	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	lack	of	control	(1147a25–b5).	I	focus	on	the	
famous	“two-syllogism”	passage,	arguing	that	it	is	best	interpreted	as	
Aristotle’s	description	of	 the	state	of	mind	of	 the	uncontrolled	agent	
before	her	uncontrolled	action.	In	section	4,	I	discuss	and	explain	Ar-
istotle’s	claim	(1147b13–7)	that	Socrates’	account	also	“comes	about”	in	
his	theory.	In	section	5,	I	conclude	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	volun-
tariness	of	uncontrolled	actions	as	Aristotle	conceives	of	them.
2.  The first part of Aristotle’s discussion (1146b30–47a24)
2.1. The first two ways of knowing but not using knowledge 
(1146b30–47a10)
Aristotle	starts	solving	the	puzzle	(1146b8–9)	by	distinguishing	three	
ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	(1146b31–1147a24).	These	dis-
tinctions	are	introduced	as	objections	to	Socrates’	view	that	while	act-
ing	without	control,	the	uncontrolled	agent	cannot	be	acting	against	
her	knowledge	but,	rather,	must	be	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	what	she	
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fact	 that	one’s	knowledge	 is	 applicable.	On	 the	contrary,	 it	 involves	
acting	as	one	knows	or	believes	one	should	not	act	when	one	knows	
one	should	not	act	that	way	(e. g.,	1146b34).43 
2.2. The third way of having but not using knowledge (1147a10–7)
Aristotle	thus	introduces	yet	another	way	of	having	but	not	using	one’s	
knowledge	 that	 is	now	explicitly	supposed	 to	 illuminate	 the	case	of	
uncontrolled	action:	
(1)	But	human	beings	also	have	knowledge	in	a	different	
way	from	the	ones	described.	For	we	see	that	 in	having	
but	 not	 using,	 the	 state	 (tēn hexin)44	 can	 differ,	 so	 that	
someone	both	has	[knowledge]	 in	a	way	and	also	does	
not	have	it,	as	with	someone	who	is	asleep,	mad,	or	drunk	
(ton katheudonta kai mainomenon kai oinōmenon).	But	those	
who	are	in	affective	states	are	in	fact	in	that	condition.	For	
spirited	desires,	sexual	appetites,	and	some	such	experi-
ences	clearly	disturb	the	body	as	well,	and	even	produce	
fits	of	madness	 in	some	people.	 It	 is	 clear	 then	 that	we	
should	say	that	the	state	of	uncontrolled people	is	like	the	
state	of	these	people.	(1147a10–7)
The	passage	makes	several	crucial	claims.	First,	one	can	have	but	not	
be	using	one’s	knowledge	in	such	a	way	that	one	can	be	said	both	to	
have	it	(in	a	way),	but	also	not	to	have	it.	Second,	this	sort	of	way	of	
having	but	not	using	one’s	knowledge	is	characteristic	of	people	who	
43.	 Irwin	(1988)	suggests	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	initially	unaware	of	her	
future	bad	appetites	and	so	fails	to	anticipate	them.	She	thus	makes	a	deci-
sion	in	which	the	presence	of	those	appetites	is	not	taken	into	account.	It	is,	of	
course,	possible	that	sometimes	one’s	decisions	are	of	the	sort	Irwin	describes.	
But	it	seems	that	often	when	one	makes	a	decision	not	to	do	something	one	
does	so	because	one	anticipates	that	one	will	feel	like	doing	it	in	the	future.	
It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	would	be	continuously	
unaware	of	her	own	bad	desires	that	she	is	repeatedly	trying	to	resist.
44.	 Alternatively,	 hē hexis	 could	 mean	 “the	 having.”	 In	 that	 case	 what	 differs	
would	be	the	having:	it	is	possible	to	have,	while	also,	in	a	way,	not	to	have	
the	knowledge	that	one	does	not	use.
one’s	action	(e. g.	that	one	is	the	driver,	or	that	the	beverage	in	one’s	
glass	is	alcoholic).	As	Aristotle	explains,	one	can	end	up	acting	against	
a	universal	proposition	(to	which	one	might	well	attend	at	the	time)	
if	one	fails	to	use	some	relevant	particular	proposition.	The	above	ex-
ample	can	be	modified	to	fit	this	case.	The	conversation	Vrinda	gets	
caught	up	in	concerns	drinking	and	driving.	She	fiercely	defends	her	
view	that	one	should	never	drink	before	driving,	yet	she	drinks	a	glass	
of	wine,	 because	 she	 temporarily	 forgets	 (being	 too	 intent	 on	 argu-
ing	her	case)	that	she	herself	has	to	drive	later	that	day.	She	thus	acts	
against	knowledge	to	which	she	is	actively	attending.42 
Socrates’	 view	needs	 to	 be	modified	 further.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 act	
against	one’s	knowledge,	provided	that	either	one	does	not	use	or	at-
tend	to	it	at	the	time	one	acts,	or	that,	although	attending	to	it	at	the	
time	one	acts,	one	is	unaware	that	it	is	applicable	to	one’s	situation	in	
the	relevant	way.	Although	 this	distinction	allows	 for	action	against	
active	knowledge,	it	is	still	compatible	with	the	view	that	uncontrolled	
action	is	impossible.	One	could	maintain	that	if	Vrinda	recalled,	at	the	
crucial	moment,	that	she	is	a	driver	that	evening,	she	would	not	have	
poured	herself	a	glass.	And	if	she	did,	this	would	be	best	explained	by	
her	re-evaluating	her	original	decision.
In	neither	of	these	two	distinctions	does	Aristotle	specify	any	par-
ticular	reason	why	one	does	not	attend	to	the	relevant	piece	of	knowl-
edge	or	premise	at	the	time	one	acts.	It	 is	 left	open	whether	it	 is	be-
cause	the	agent	does	not	know,	temporarily	forgets,	or	some	cognitive	
failure	is	in	place.	Actions	in	which	one	acts	against	knowledge	in	this	
way	 can	 thus	 include	 cases	 of	 forgetfulness,	 absentmindedness,	 dis-
traction,	confusion,	excitement,	or	simple	ignorance.	But	uncontrolled	
action	does	not	involve	lack	of	knowledge	or	lack	of	awareness	of	the	
42.	 Commentators	often	think	that	the	particular	proposition	in	which	the	uni-
versal	term	refers	to	the	agent	is	irrelevant,	on	the	grounds	that	in	the	MA 
Aristotle	says	that	the	particular	premise	which	refers	to	the	agent,	is	obvi-
ous	and	thought	“does	not	stop	to	consider	it”	(701a	25).	But	as	my	example	
makes	clear,	it	is	possible	not	to	know	some	relevant	facts	about	oneself,	or	
not	attend	to	them,	and	to	act	against	the	knowledge	one	is	actively	attend-
ing	to	because	of	 that.	For	a	discussion,	see	Kenny	(1979,	156–7).	See	also	
Perry	(1979).
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the	states	of	mind	it	mentions.49	We	must	thus	look	for	illumination	
elsewhere.	We	can	begin	with	a	passage	in	the	Physics	which	contains	
a	useful	remark	on	the	state	of	mind	of	the	people	in	the	conditions	
mentioned	in	NE 7.3:	
(2)	Further,	 just	as	with	someone	who	has	passed	 from	
being	drunk,	asleep,	or	being	sick	(ek tou methuein ē kath-
eudein ē nosein)	into	its	contrary,	we	do	not	say	that	he	has	
become	knowing	again,	despite	the	fact	that	he	was	pre-
viously	not	able	to	use	his	knowledge.	(Phys. 247b13–5)
Despite	 some	 terminological	differences,	 the	 states	of	mind	 that	Ar-
istotle	mentions	 in	 this	passage	are	 identical	 to	 the	conditions	men-
tioned	in	the	passage	in	NE 7.3.	In	the	NE 7.3	passage	(as	well	as	at	NE 
7.10,	1152a15),	Aristotle	uses	the	verb	oinoomai	(to	be	drunk	or	tipsy)	
to	describe	the	drunk	agent.	It	is	sometimes	thought	that	the	fact	that	
the	word	oinōmenos can	be	used	 to	describe	people	who	are	merely	
tipsy	(rather	than	dead	drunk)	is	of	significance	in	the	context	of	the	
discussion	of	lack	of	control.	However,	in	the	Physics	passage,	in	what	
surely	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 same	 thought,	Aristotle	
49.	 Perhaps	the	only	obvious	point	of	the	analogy	is	that	it	compares	or	likens	the	
ways	in	which	the	people	in	the	grip	of	passions	(and	so	also	the	uncontrolled	
people)	on	 the	one	hand,	and	 the	mad,	drunk	and	sleeping	people	on	 the	
other	hand,	relate	to	their	knowledge.	The	analogy	leaves	it,	however,	quite	
undetermined	what	the	nature	of	the	relationship	to	one’s	knowledge	is	sup-
posed	to	be	like.	If	taken	in	isolation,	it	forces	the	interpreter	to	supply	an	an-
swer	which	can,	however,	very	well	make	the	analogy	strained.	For	example,	
Corcilius	(2008a,	153–4)	suggests	that	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	emotions	are	
not	in	the	right	relation	to	her	knowledge.	But	it	is	difficult	to	see	not	only	
why	one	should	think	that	it	is	a	significant	feature	of	the	drunk	or	sleeping	
people	that	their	emotions	are	not	in	the	right	relation	to	their	knowledge	but	
also	why	that	should	have	any	explanatory	power	in	relation	to	their	inability	
to	use	that	knowledge.	What	is	at	stake	is	not	the	fact	that	emotions	hinder	
the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 from	using	 her	 knowledge.	Aristotle	 takes	 that	 for	
granted	and	so	he	 includes,	without	any	argument,	 the	uncontrolled	agent	
among	those	who	are	in	the	grip	of	emotions.	What	is	at	stake	is	an	elucida-
tion	of	the	way	in	which	this	can	happen.	Aristotle	uses	the	analogy	between	
people	who	are	in	the	grip	of	passions	and	those	who	are	in	the	mad,	drunk,	
or	sleeping	state,	in	order	to	clarify	the	case	of	lack	of	control	which,	in	his	
view,	falls	into	the	broader	category	of	people	in	the	grip	of	passions.
are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep.	Third,	people	who	are	in	the	grip	of	emo-
tions	 are	 also	 in	 such	 a	 condition.45	 As	Aristotle	 says,	 various	 emo-
tional	states,	such	as	spirited	desires	and	sexual	appetites,	can,	in	some	
people	and	on	some	occasions,	alter	a	person’s	bodily	condition,	and	
thus	also	his	state	of	soul	or	mind.46	Fourth,	since	uncontrolled	people	
follow	their	non-rational	impulses	or	feelings	against	reason,	Aristotle	
concludes	that	their	state	of	mind	(with	respect	to	knowledge)	is	like	
that	of	the	people	in	the	grip	of	emotions.	When	they	act	without	con-
trol,	they	have,	but	are	not	using,	their	knowledge	in	the	way	in	which	
drunk,	mad,	or	sleeping	people	also	have	but	are	not	using	it.47 
When	Aristotle	asserts	that	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	state	of	mind	
is	 like	or	similar	(homoiōs)	to	that	of	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or	
asleep,	he	can	mean	that	there	is	only	a	resemblance	between	those	
states.	But	it	is	more	likely	that	Aristotle	means	that	the	same	account48 
of	the	way	in	which	one	can	have	but	not	be	using	one’s	knowledge	
applies	to	all	of	them.	A	mention	of	mere	resemblance	(without	speci-
fying	any	further	details)	between	the	states	would	not	be	illuminat-
ing.	However,	 the	passage	does	not	offer	any	further	explanation	of	
the	relevant	way	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	that	pertains	to	
45.	 Obviously	not	all	people	who	experience	emotions	are	controlled	by	them.	
But	Aristotle’s	 point	 is	 that	 people	 sometimes	 experience	 emotions	which	
are	such	that	they	disturb	their	bodies	and	minds	to	the	extent	that	they	can	
sometimes	“even	produce	fits	of	madness.”	In	saying	this,	he	makes	clear	that	
he	has	 in	mind	 cases	 in	which	 emotions	have	decisive	 influence	over	 the	
agent’s	rational	abilities.
46.	 I	take	it	that	in	kai to sōma	at	1147a16	the	kai	points	to	soul,	or	mind	(alterna-
tively	one	can	supply	knowledge	as	that	 is	the	subject	of	discussion,	but	 it	
seems	to	me	preferable	to	supply	soul	as	the	counterpart	of	body).
47.	 This	claim	is	repeated	again	at	NE 7.10,	1152a15	and	should	be	compared	with	
MM 1201b9–23.
48.	 There	are	many	passages	in	which	homoiōs can	be	translated	as	meaning	“in	
the	same	way.” See,	for	example,	DA 402b8,	404b6,	or	407a25.	Of	course,	Ar-
istotle	is	not	saying	that	their	overall states	of	minds	are	exactly	the	same;	if	
he	wanted	to,	he	could	have	said,	for	example,	that	their	minds	are	all	in	the	
same	way	(ton auton tropon echei).	His	point	concerns	only	the	way	they	have	
but	do	not	use	their	knowledge.
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that	 the	 conditions	 of	 being	 drunk,	 mad,	 and	 asleep	 have	 in	 com-
mon:	 they	 are	 global	 conditions	 affecting	 the	 agent’s	 knowledge	 in-
discriminately	and	across	 the	board.	 In	other	words,	Aristotle	 is	not	
likening	uncontrolled	action	to	a	case	of	forgetfulness	(amnēmosunē),	
self-deception	(heautōn exapatān),52	inattentiveness	(aprosexia),	or	any	
other	such	condition	which	makes	one	unable	to	use	or	to	focus	on	
some	specific	piece	of	knowledge.	This	comes	up	clearly	in	passages	in	
which	Aristotle	makes	the	various	conditions	we	discussed	so	far	(i. e.,	
sleep,	disease,	emotions,	desires)	responsible	for	disabling	one’s	mind	
(nous) or	reasoning	(logismos)	across the board:
(3)	And	because	phantasiai persist	in	us	and	are	similar	to	
perceptions,	animals	often	act	according	 to	 them,	some	
because	they	don’t	have	mind,	 like	the	brutes,	some	be-
cause	the	mind	is	temporarily	covered	over	(epikaluptest-
hai)	by	emotion,	or	disease,	or	sleep,	like	human	beings.	
(DA 3.3,	429a4–8)
(4)53	 For	 it	 is	 so	 in	 the	 case	 of	 persons	who	 are	 drunk	
(methuontōn).	For	those	who	are	drunk,	when	the	drunk-
enness	(methē)	has	passed	off,	are	themselves	again.	Rea-
son	(logos)	was	not	expelled	from	them,	nor	was	knowl-
edge,	but	it	was	overcome	by	the	drunkenness;	and	when	
they	have	got	rid	of	the	drunkenness,	they	are	themselves	
again.	So,	then,	it	is	with	the	uncontrolled	person.	His	af-
fection	(pathos) gains	the	mastery	and	brings	his	reason-
ing	(logismos)	to	a	standstill.	But	when	the	affection,	like	
52.	 See	Pol. 1260a25	for	the	use	of	this	expression.	Aristotle’s	account	of	lack	of	
control	is	interpreted	as	a	case	of	self-deception	by	Corcilius	(2008a).
53.	 Although	 it	 is	generally	not	 the	best	practice	 to	use	doctrines	 from	Magna 
Moralia as	evidence,	in	this	case	it	seems	to	me	that	we	are	entitled	to	do	so	
because	 the	 doctrine	 it	 spells	 out	 is	 fully	 consistent	with	 textual	 evidence	
from	elsewhere,	and	it	makes	explicit	a	point	which	other	passages	contain	
implicitly.
uses	the	stronger	word	methuō	 (to	be	drunk)	and	the	same	stronger	
verb	is	also	used	in	MM at	1202a1–7	(translated	below),	where	Aristo-
tle	(or	the	author	of	MM)	draws	another	analogy	between	the	drunk	
and	the	uncontrolled	agent.	Even	if	one	doubts	the	MM passage,	the	
passage	in	the	Phys. is	sufficient	to	show	that	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	
Aristotle	would	use	 these	 two	words,	 in	 the	same	contexts,	 to	mark	
distinct	states.50	In	any	case,	my	interpretation	of	the	analogy	does	not	
require	 that	 the	agent	 is	dead	drunk	(in	 fact,	 this	would	undermine	
it),	but	only	 that	she	 is	sufficiently	under	 the	 influence	of	wine	 that	
she	is	no	longer	sober	and	this	condition	can	very	well	be	described	
by	both	words.	Rather	than	the	mad	(mainomenos) agent	in	NE 7.3,	we	
have	now	someone	who	is	sick	(nosein).	But	these	two	words	can	be	
taken	as	equivalent	since	both	words	(in	Greek)	can	signify	temporary	
“disease”	of	the	mind	due	to	rage,	passion,	or	desire.
According	 to	 passage	 2,	 people	 sometimes	 end	up	 in	 conditions,	
such	as	being	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep	in	which	they	temporarily	cannot	
use	their	knowledge.	When	passages	1	and	2	are	put	together,	they	im-
ply	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	while	acting	without	control	is	also	in	
such	a	condition:	she	cannot	use	her	knowledge	which	she	neverthe-
less	still	possesses.51	This	is	the	first	and	the	most	obvious	point	of	the	
analogy	and	one	clearly	attested	by	textual	evidence.	
Another	point	becomes	clear	once	one	focuses	on	a	notable	feature	
50.	These	two	words	are	used	synonymously	by	Plato	at	Leg. 775b–d:	“To	drink	to	
the	point	of	inebriation	(eis methēn)	is	not	proper	at	any	place,	except	for	the	
feasts	of	the	god	who	made	us	the	gift	of	wine,	and	it	is	dangerous	too,	and	so	
especially	for	those	who	take	marriage	seriously.	…it	is	necessary	that	procre-
ation	not	be	performed	when	the	bodies	are	dissolved	by	inebriation	(hupo 
methēs)…	But	one	who	is	drunk	(diōnōmenos)	moves	and	is	moved	around	in	
every	way,	raging	both	body	and	soul.”	Similarly,	Euripides	uses	oinoomai in	
Bacchae	(685–90)	to	mark	the	stronger	state	of	inebriation.	It	is	true,	of	course,	
that	oinoomai can	be	and	often	is	used	to	express	a	moderate	state	of	being	
drunk,	whereas	methuō is	more	exclusively	tied	to	being	visibly	drunk.	Both	
can,	however,	be	used	to	simply	denote	a	general	state	of	not	being	sober.	If	
Aristotle	wanted	to	contrast	being	drunk	with	being	merely	tipsy,	he	could	
have	used	other,	more	exact	words.	So,	at	Prob. 875a29–875a40,	one	who	is	
methuōn is	contrasted	with	one	who	is	akrothōrax,	which	word	unambiguously	
means	“slightly	drunk”	or	“tipsy.”	See	also	note	71	below.	
51.	 For	this	point,	see	also	Zingano	(2007).	
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made	intelligible	as	an	account	of	lack	of	control.	But	before	doing	so,	
I	want	to	address	two	immediate	worries.	First,	one	might	think	that	
any	 such	 general	 incapacitation	 of	 reason	 or	mind	would	 require	 a	
rather	intense	onset	of	emotions	and	that	this	would	severely	restrict	
the	kind	of	uncontrolled	behavior	Aristotle’s	theory	(as	I	interpret	it)	
can	explain.	Second,	one	might	 think	 that	 the	very	 idea	of	 the	 inca-
pacitation	of	 reason	 is	 implausible	as	an	explanation	of	any	kind	of	
uncontrolled	action.
The	first	worry	might	lead	one	to	point	to	NE 7.6,	where	Aristotle	
distinguishes	between	two	kinds	of	uncontrolled	agents.	On	the	one	
hand,	there	are	the	weak	uncontrolled	agents	who	“having	deliberated	
do	 not	 stick	 to	 the	 results	 of	 their	 deliberation	 on	 account	 of	 affec-
tion	 (pathos)”	 (1150b21–2).	On	 the	other	hand,	 there	are	 the	 impetu-
ous	uncontrolled	agents	who	“are	led	by	their	affection	on	account	of	
not	having	deliberated”	(1150b22–3).	So,	when	Aristotle	says	that	the	
weak	uncontrolled	agents	succumb	to	pleasures	or	temptations	small-
er	(1151a1)	than	the	impetuous	agents,	it	might	be	thought	that	the	ap-
petites	of	the	weak	uncontrolled	agents	are	just	not	strong	enough	to	
produce	the	kind	of	disablement	required	for	my	account.	Right	from	
the	start,	then,	my	account	of	the	meaning	of	NE 7.3,	1147a10–7	would	
be	well-suited	only	for	the	impetuous	type	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	
in	whom	appetites	are	quick	or	intense	(1150b27).
The	proper	 answer	 to	 this	 objection	 can	only	 be	 given	once	my	
account	is	fully	on	the	table	and	I	will	come	back	to	it	at	the	end	of	
section	3.	But	it	is	important	to	notice	that	Aristotle	himself	does	not,	
in	any	of	the	passages	quoted	above,	presuppose	that	the	particular	af-
fection	that	is	responsible	for	bringing	one’s	reasoning	to	a	standstill	is	
marked	by	particularly	strong	intensity.	In	fact,	he	does	not	say	that	the	
passions	 that	are	 required	 to	produce	 the	 impetuous	kind	of	uncon-
trolled	action	need	to	be	particularly	strong	or	intense	either.	Rather,	
he	says	that	certain	sorts	of	people,	only	some	of	whom	have	intense	
desires,	are	likely	to	suffer	from	that	kind	of	lack	of	control:
the	drunkenness,	has	passed	off,	he	is	himself	again.	(MM 
1202a1–7) 54
In	passage	3,	Aristotle	tells	us	that	the	mind	(nous)	(rather	than	some	
specific	belief	or	thought)	is	“covered	over”	as	a	whole	since	it	is	not	
the	case	that	we	continue	to	guide	our	actions	by	its	cognitive	power	
at	all,	but,	as	he	says,	by	phantasia.	In	passage	4,	the	affection	(drunk-
enness	 or	 appetite)	 brings	 reasoning	 to	 a	 standstill.55	We	must	 con-
clude	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	the	agents	in	the	various	conditions	he	
mentions	cannot	access	or	make	use	of	their	knowledge	because those	
conditions	 (sleep,	 disease,	 emotions,	 and	 appetites)	 can	 and	 some-
times	do	render	one’s	rational	faculties	inoperative:	they	temporarily	
“cover	over”	the	mind.56 
According	to	these	passages,	 then,	Aristotle	thinks	that	an	action	
due	to	lack	of	control	involves	general	incapacitation	of	one’s	reason-
ing	abilities.	There	is	much	work	to	be	done	before	this	idea	can	be	
54.	 The	translation	is	that	of	St.	G.	Stock	in	J.	Barnes	(ed.),	Complete Works of Aris-
totle (Princeton,	1984),	modified.
55.	 In	his	discussion	of	pleasure	in	NE 7.11,	Aristotle	discusses	the	reasons	why	
some	people	think	that	pleasure	is	not	a	good.	One	of	the	reasons	is	that	plea-
sure	impedes	one’s	ability	to	think	and	that,	in	the	case	of	certain	pleasures	
(sexual	ones)	it	makes	it	impossible	to	think	at	all:	“Further,	pleasures	are	an	
impediment	to	thought	(empodion tō phronein),	and	more	so	the	more	one	en-
joys	them.	For	example,	no	one	can	think	about	anything	while	enjoying	the	
pleasures	of	sex	(oudena gar an dunasthai noēsai ti en autē)”	(NE 7.11,	1152b16–8).	
This	passage	is	problematic	as	evidence	for	any	view	held	by	Aristotle,	since	
it	is	a	report	of	an	argument	by	other	people.	However,	when	Aristotle	later	
rebuts	this	argument	(NE 7.12,	1153a20–3),	he	does	not	deny	that	some	plea-
sures	can	impede	thinking	(i. e.,	make	it	hard	or	even	impossible	for	the	one	
who	feels	the	pleasure	to	think).	Rather,	he	says	that	no	state	is	impeded	by	
pleasures	 that	are	proper	 to	 it.	There	are	pleasures	arising	 from	study	and	
learning	 and	 those	will	make	us	 study	 even	more.	But	 the	possibility	 that	
pleasures	alien	to	the	state	can	impede	it	is	left	open.
56.	See	also	NE	3.12,	1119b8–10:	“For	when	someone	is	without	understanding	
the	desire	for	the	pleasant	is	insatiable	and	indiscriminate,	and	the	activity	of	
appetite	increases	what	he	had	from	birth	and	if	the	appetites	are	large	and	
intense	they	even	drive	out	reasoning	(ton logismon ekkrouousin).”	Although	
this	 passage	 focuses	 on	 the	 vicious	 or	 intemperate	 people,	 it	 nevertheless	
provides	evidence	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	appetites	or	desires	have	the	abil-
ity	to	disable	one’s	capacity	to	reason.
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uncontrolled	agent’s	reason	gets	suspended	not	because	of	the	inten-
sity	of	her	appetite,	but	because	she	has	failed	to	habituate	herself,	in-
cluding	her	reason,	to	the	point	at	which	she	can	resist	them.	Even	a	
mild	storm	can	sink	a	boat	with	a	negligent	or	inexperienced	crew.	
The	second	worry	originates	in	the	modern	conception	of	akrasia 
which	begins	from	the	assumption	that	in	acting	akratically one	inten-
tionally	 and	voluntarily acts	 against	 one’s	 better	 judgment.	 It	 is	 then	
assumed	 that	 intentional	 and	voluntary	action	entails,	 among	other	
things,	that	one’s	capacity	to	reason,	deliberate,	or	perform	logical	in-
ferences	has	not	been	compromised.	In	view	of	this	conception,	the	
claim	 that	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent’s	 reason	 is	 temporarily	 disabled	
during	uncontrolled	action	might	strike	one	as	intuitively	implausible,	
perhaps	even	a	non-starter.58	There	are,	however,	several	points	that	
should	significantly	reduce	this	initial	reaction.
First,	Aristotle’s	claim	might	not	have	struck	ancient	Greek	readers	
as	odd	(or	implausible)	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	us.	In	his	The Greeks 
and the Irrational,	E.	R.	Dodds	not	only	correctly	 identifies	Aristotle’s	
claim	at	1147a10–7	as	entailing	a	temporary	suspension	of	one’s	(ratio-
nal)	mind,59	but	also	traces	the	quite	general	view	that	various	kinds	
of	 irrational,	 unwise,	 paradoxical	 or	 otherwise	 unaccountable	 acts	
are	due	to	a	temporary	suspension	of	one’s	mind	all	the	way	back	to	
Homer.	In	Homer	(especially	in	the	Iliad),	such	actions	are	the	results	
of	blindness	of	judgment	or	delusion	(atē), which	are	usually	due	to	
various	external	agencies	 (such	as	gods).60	Moreover,	despite	 the	at-
tribution	of	such	actions	to	external	agencies,	the	pre-Platonic	writers	
nevertheless	clearly	thought	that	at	least	sometimes	people	who	acted	
in	 such	ways	 (i. e.,	 as	a	 result	of	atē) were	not	automatically	exempt	
from	responsibility	or	blame.61
By	the	time	we	get	to	Aristotle’s	view	about	lack	of	control	(which	is	
58.	See	section	1.2	for	interpretations	of	Aristotle’s	theory	along	these	lines.
59.	Dodds	(1951,	185).	
60.	Ibid.,	5.
61.	 See	the	illuminating	discussion	in	Williams	(2008,	ch.	3).
(5)	The	quickly	excitable	and	the	volatile people	are	most	
likely	 to	 suffer	 from	 impetuous	 lack	 of	 control	 because	
the	former’s	[appetites]	are	so	quick	and	the	latter’s	so	in-
tense	that	they	do	not	wait	for	reason	on	account	of	their	
tendency	to	follow	phantasia (dia to akolouthētikai einai tē 
phantasia).	(NE 7.7,	1150b25–28)
The	passage	 clearly	makes	 room	 for	 other	 kinds	of	 agents	 (than	
the	excitable	and	volatile)	who	can	sometimes	be	prone	to	instances	
of	 impetuous	uncontrolled	action57	 and	 these	agents	need	not	have	
particularly	intense	desires.	The	passage	mentions	people	who	have	
quick	 rather	 than	strong	appetites	and	who	can	act	without	 control	
on	that	account.	Moreover,	 it	 is	not	even	clear	that	the	weak	uncon-
trolled	agent’s	desires	are	weaker	than	those	of	the	impetuous	one	to	
begin	with	since	all	Aristotle	says	is	that	the	weak	agent	succumbs	to	
smaller	ones	because	(one	can	assume)	he	has	already	tried	to	calm	
them	down	in	his	deliberation.	In	fact,	every	form	of	lack	of	control	is	
characterized	by	the	fact	that	it	is	succumbing	to	pleasures	that	“most	
people	can	resist”	(1150b14).	In	other	words,	lack	of	control	is	not	char-
acterized	by	strong	and,	for that reason, uncontrollable	emotions	or	de-
sires,	but	as	a	condition	 in	which	one	 fails	 to	control	desires	which	
are	 normally	 controllable.	 Their	 uncontrollability	 is	 not	 necessarily	
explained	by	their	intensity	(see	1150b6–12),	but	by	the	agent	having	
become	such	(through	habituation)	that	even	relatively	weak	desires	
cause	him	to	lose	control	over	them.	
Finally,	my	account	does	not	require	that	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	
appetite	is	particularly	intense	—	it	only	requires	that	it	be	capable	of	
bringing	about	the	suspension	of	reason	in	the	particular	agent	(who	
is,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent,	 particularly	 susceptible	 to	
its	 influence).	 What	 counts	 is	 not	 so	 much	 the	 appetite’s	 intensity	
but	 the	agent’s	overall	preparedness	 to	deal	with	her	appetites.	The	
57.	 Notably,	even	the	good	can	act	in	this	way	at	MM 1203a30–6,	if	they	are	of	the	
right	kind	(warm)	temperament.
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states,	such	as	being	asleep	or	drunk,	follow	their	phantasia against,	or	
instead	of,	their	knowledge	or	reason)65	should	be	read	in	connection	
with	other	passages,	such	as	NE 1.3,	1095a2–10	in	which	people	are	said	
to	follow	their	affections	or	feelings	rather	than	reason.	The	cumulative	
evidence	of	these	passages	strongly	suggests	that	when	Aristotle	says	
that	one’s	mind	or	reason	(nous)	is	temporarily	disabled	and	that	one,	
in	such	a	state,	follows	phantasia,	he	is	not	denying	beliefs	(in	a	broad	
sense)	or	coherent	trains	of	thoughts	to	the	agent	but	rather	something	
more	specific.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	will	bring	out	the	meaning	of	
Aristotle’s	claim	that	the	uncontrolled	person	“follows	phantasia”	rather	
than	reason	by	drawing	attention	to	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	way	
in	which	sleeping	people	(i. e.,	one	of	three	sorts	of	people	used	in	the	
analogy	at	1147a10–7)	“follow	phantasia”	while	dreaming.	I	will	argue	
that	Aristotle	operates	with	a	 sufficiently	 rich	notion	of	non-rational	
cognition	to	allow	him	to	account	for	the	relevant	phenomena	in	con-
nection	with	uncontrolled	 actions.	As	 I	will	 argue,	Aristotle’s	 uncon-
trolled	agent	is	not	prevented	from	using	her	knowledge,	or	from	hav-
ing	beliefs	(in	a	broad	sense	of	the	term)	about	any	relevant	facts.	Her	
problem	is	that	she	cannot	use	her	knowledge	as knowledge	or	form	
and	hold	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	reasons	(i. e.,	forming	them	by	treating	
some	other	facts	or	beliefs	as	what	makes	them	believable).	The	idea	
can	be,	perhaps	less	confusingly,	expressed	by	saying	that	the	uncon-
trolled	person	has	at	her	disposal	all	the	information	that	would	nor-
mally	constituted	her	knowledge,	but	she	temporarily	cannot	use	this	
information	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 its	use	would	qualify	her	as	having	
understanding	(rather	than	mere	knowledge)	of	what	she	is	doing.	
65.	 Perhaps	most	strikingly	at	DA 433a10–1.	See	also	Insomn. 459a1–8	(translated	
below).	There	is	an	instructive	passage	in	Prob. 903b29–26:	“Why	are	those	
who	hesitate	 in	 their	 speech	melancholic?	 Is	 it	because	being	melancholic	
they	quickly	follow	phantasia (akolouthein tē phantasia),	and	this	is	character-
istic	of	those	who	hesitate	in	their	speech.	For	the	impulse	to	speak	rushes	
before	their	ability	to	do	so,	just	as	the	soul	too	quickly	follows	phantasia (tō 
phanenti).	 The	 same	 thing	 happens	with	 those	who	 lisp.	 For	 the	 parts	 [re-
sponsible	for	speech]	are	too	slow.	A	sign	of	this	is	that	people	who	are	drunk	
(oinōmenoi)	 become	 lispers,	 since	 then	 they	 follow	 phainomena most	 of	 all	
(malista tois phainomenois akolouthousi)	and	not	their	mind.”
a	kind	of	irrational	or	unwise	action),	this	temporary	suspension	is	no	
longer	exclusively	due	to	such	external	agencies	(I	will	say	more	about	
Aristotle’s	view	in	section	2.5	below);	and	in	the	cases	in	which	it	is	due	
to	factors	over	which	an	agent	is	expected	to	have	control,	the	respon-
sibility	for	the	action	is	placed	squarely	on	the	agent.62	Aristotle’s	view	
(which	is,	as	we	shall	see,	neither	identical	with	the	ordinary	view	that	
we	sometimes	do	what	we	know	is	bad	while	knowing	—	actively	and	
perfectly	well	—	that	it	is	bad,	nor	with	Socrates’	view	that	we	never	act	
that	way)	is	thus	a	view	which	has	some	basis	in	the	preceding	history	
of	thinking	about	human	psychology	and	which	would,	therefore,	also	
have,	to	his	contemporaries,	a	certain	amount	of	intuitive	appeal.63 
Second,	one	should	not understand	Aristotle’s	claim	to	mean	 that	
the	uncontrolled	agent,	while	acting	without	control,	is	not	able	to	use	
or	attend	to	his	knowledge	or	beliefs	at all or	that	he	cannot	think	(in	
a	broad	sense)	at	all.	As	passages	2	and	3	 indicate,	when	people	are	
in	states	such	as	being	asleep,	drunk,	or	in	the	grip	of	emotions,	they	
are	not	governed	by	reason	but,	instead,	by	their	non-rational	desires	
(appetites)	and	phantasia.64	That	 this	account	applies	 to	uncontrolled	
people	is	confirmed	most	explicitly	by	passage	5.	This	passage	(as	well	
as	 other	 passages	 in	which	Aristotle	 suggests	 that	 people	 in	 certain	
62.	 I	argue	for	this	view	in	“Agency	and	Responsibility	in	Aristotle’s	Eudemian Eth-
ics,”	forthcoming	in	Phronesis 60:	206–51.
63.	See	for	example	Gorgias’	Encomium of Helen,	especially	sections	16–19,	where	
he	discusses	the	love	as	the	cause	of	her	adultery	since	love,	just	like	fear,	can	
“extinguish	and	expel	thought” (houtōs apesbese kai exēlasen ho phobos to noēma).
64.	My	interpretation	of	 this	aspect	of	Aristotle’s	 theory	of	 lack	of	control	 is	 in	
partial	agreement	with	the	interpretation	developed	by	Moss	(2012).	Perhaps	
the	main	difference	is	that,	on	my	account,	there	is	no	perceptual	(or	evalu-
ative)	illusion	taking	place,	as	Moss	suggests,	since	there	is	no	distortion	of	
appearances	 taking	place	 at	 all.	 In	 fact,	 given	 the	 very	 striking	 similarities	
that	her	interpretation	bears	to	my	account,	there	should	be	no	need	to	for	
such	distortions	 since	 the	work	 is	done	by	 the	disablement	of	 reason	and	
not	by	perceptual	or	evaluative	illusions.	I	suspect	that	the	main	reason	she	
needs	something	 like	evaluative	 illusion	 to	 take	place	 is	 that	although	she	
also	claims	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	follows	phantasia because	of	the	dis-
ablement	of	reason	(113),	she	does	not	offer	an	account	of	what	this	disable-
ment	of	reason	might	be,	why	it	occurs,	or	what	cognitive	resources	are	still	
available	to	the	agent.	
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(6)	Then	could	it	be	true	that	one	[i. e.	the	dreamer]	is	not	
seeing	anything,	yet	not	true	that	the	sense	is	in	no	way	
affected?	Is	it	possible,	rather,	that	both	sight	and	the	oth-
er	senses	are	affected	somehow,	and	 that	each	of	 these	
impinges	 in	 some	way	upon	perception,	 as	with	 a	wak-
ing	person,	though	not	in	the	same	way	as	with	a	waking	
person?	And	does	belief sometimes	say	that	it	is	false,	as	
it	does	for	waking	people,	while	at	other	times	it	is	held	
in	check	and	follows	the	phantasia (akolouthei tō phantas-
mati)?	(Insomn.	459a1–8)67
In	the	passage,	Aristotle	contrasts	two	cases:	on	the	one	hand,	seeing	
someone	in	a	dream	and,	on	the	other	hand,	having	an	illusion	of	that	
person	while	being	awake.	In	the	former	case,	while	one	has	a	dream	
in	which	one	sees	Coriscus,	one	also	forms	a	belief	that	Coriscus	is	re-
ally	present.	In	the	latter	case,	when	one	is	awake	and	one’s	power	of	
forming	beliefs	is	not	held	in	check,	one	declares	the	appearance	to	be	
false.	The	reason	why	one	declares	the	appearance	of	Coriscus	false	
in	the	latter	case	is	that,	while	awake,	one	is	able	to	evaluate	whether	
there	are,	in	addition	to	the	appearance	of	Coriscus,	any	reasons to	be-
lieve	that	Coriscus	is	really	there.	Since,	presumably,	there	are	no	such	
reasons	(as	 the	example	presupposes),	one	declares	 the	appearance	
false.68	In	contrast,	while	one	is	asleep,	the	belief	is	formed	without	em-
ploying	any	such	considerations.	The	sleeping	person’s	judging	faculty	
is	held	in	check	and	she	can	only	form	beliefs	or	judgments	according	
67.	The	translation	is	that	of	D.	Gallop,	Aristotle: On Sleep and Dreams (Warminster,	
1996),	slightly	modified.
68.	In	DA 3.3,	Aristotle	explains	how	we	can	have	a	 false	appearance	of	 some-
thing	and	simultaneously	a	true	supposition	(hupolēpsis)	about	it:	the	sun	can	
appear	to	us	to	be	a	foot	across,	but	we	suppose	it	to	be	larger	than	the	inhib-
ited	world	(428b1–4).	Supposition	is	to	be	distinguished	from	mere	phantasia 
because	it	involves	conviction	(pistis)	and	so	also	persuasion	and	reason	(lo-
gos)	(428a20–5).	It	thus	involves	taking	something	to	be	true	because	one	has	
or	thinks	that	one	has	some	reason	for	taking	it	to	be	so	over	and	above	how	
it	appears	to	one.	
2.3. Uncontrolled action and phantasia
According	to	Aristotle,	people	affected	by	drunkenness,	fits	of	madness,	
or	sleep	can	and	sometimes	do	behave	in	clever,	cognitively	rich	ways.	
A	drunken	person	may	correctly	recite	verses.	A	sleeping	person	may	
be	trying,	while	dreaming,	to	memorize	something	using	a	mnemonic	
system	that	she	has	previously	learned	(Insomn.	485b15–25).	Although	
these	people	use	their	knowledge,	their	use	of	it	is	irrational	in	the	fol-
lowing	sense:	they	act	in	a	way	that,	in	a	given	situation,	they	would	
themselves	 think	 inappropriate	 under	 normal	 circumstances	 (i. e.,	 if	
they	were	not drunk	or	in	a	fit	of	madness).	A	drunken	person	can	sing	
a	drinking	song	that	she	has	previously	learnt	on	an	occasion	(say,	a	
memorial	service)	that	is	not	suitable	for	it	according	to	the	person’s	
own	beliefs.	This	way	of	acting	reveals	that	one’s	rational	powers	are	
not	properly	operational.	We	see	the	madman	or	the	drunken	person	
as	behaving	 irrationally	because	 they	behave	 in	ways	 in	which	 they	
should	not	and	would	not	behave	in	the	light	of	their	own	knowledge	
or	beliefs	about	what	they	should	or	should	not	be	doing.	A	descrip-
tion	along	these	general	lines	fits	the	uncontrolled	agent.	We	see	her	
behavior	as	irrational	from	the	point	of	view	of	her	own	knowledge	
and	beliefs.	She	acts	against	her	decision,	which	is	expressive	of	her	
knowledge	about	what	she	thinks	is	good	for	her.
Passages	3	and	5	suggest	 that	 the	explanation	of	why	 the	uncon-
trolled	 agent’s	 action	 seems	 irrational	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 acting	 ac-
cording	to	her	knowledge	or	rationally	grounded	beliefs	she	“follows	
phantasia.”66	A	clue	to	understanding	this	expression	is	given	in	a	pas-
sage	 in	 the	De Insomniis,	where	Aristotle	 considers	 the	view	 that	 al-
though	people	who	are	asleep	cannot	be	perceiving	(strictly	speaking),	
their	perceptual	capacity	can	nevertheless	be	affected	by	the	remnants	
of	sensory	perception	(i. e.,	phantasiai).	When	that	happens,	 their	be-
liefs	and	emotional	states	“follow	the	phantasia”:	
66.	Aristotle’s	most	systematic	exposition	of	his	theory	of	phantasia is	in	DA 3.3.	
That	discussion	is,	however,	too	obscure	to	be	analyzed	here	in	detail	and,	in	
any	case,	the	relevant	features	of	his	theory	are	available	elsewhere.	I	take	DA 
3.3	to	be	compatible	with	my	account	of	lack	of	control,	but	the	defense	of	
that	claim	has	to	be	made	separately.
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consideration	of	reasons	(over	and	above	the	appearance)	for	believ-
ing	it.	In	such	cases,	one’s	reaction	to	the	appearance	corresponds	to	
(or	reflects)	one’s	particular	state,	desires,	habits,	or	character	(Insomn. 
460b3–15).	 In	 the	absence	of	reasoned	oversight	(as	when	asleep	or	
drunk),	what	people	 recognize	as	salient	 features	of	 their	 situations	
are	not	features	that	are	(or	would	be)	salient	according	to	their	rea-
soned	 judgments	 or	 knowledge	 but,	 rather,	what	 seems	 salient	 are	
those	features	that	are	recorded	as	motivationally	significant	in	their	
experience	and	that	are,	in	some	relevant	way,	connected	to	their	cur-
rent	condition.	What	stands	out	as	salient	about	a	given	situation	to	an	
amorous	man	(when	he	is	in	amorous	passion)	is	what	is,	in	his	experi-
ence,	connected	to	the	object	or	objects	of	his	love	(Insomn. 460b3–15).	
The	amorous	person	will	think,	on	the	basis	of	mere	resemblance,	that	
he	sees	someone	he	loves,	even	if	there	are	no	reasons	to	think	that.71 
In	the	case	of	uncontrolled	action,	the	idea	is	that	the	uncontrolled	
agent	“follows	phantasia”	insofar	as	she	acts	on	the	basis	of	the	mere	
appearance	of	something	as	pleasant	rather	than	on	the	basis,	reflect-
ed	in	her	decision,	of	her	reasoned	judgment	about	what	she	should	
do	 (DA 433b5–10).	 She	 does	 not	 act	 on	 her	 decision	 that	 she	 had	
71.	 It	 is	 in	this	sense	that	one	needs	to	understand	Aristotle’s	reference	to	peo-
ple	who	are	drunk	as	well.	What	he	wants	to	point	out	is	that	when	drunk	
people	make	judgments,	they	make	them	on	the	basis	of	appearances	rather	
than	on	the	basis	of	deliberation	or	reflection,	and	that	they	do	this	because of	
their	state.	There	is	a	very	instructive	passage	in	the	Problems. In	the	passage,	
people	who	are	drunk	but	still	can	judge	are	said	to	be	unable	to	judge	well	
because	of	 their	drunkenness:	“Why	is	 it	 that	one	who	is	 tipsy	(akrothōrax)	
behaves	more	badly	 than	one	who	 is	more	drunk	 (mallon methuontos)	 and	
more	than	[even]	the	sober	man?	Is	it	because	the	sober	man	judges	well	(eu 
krinei)	but	one	who	is	completely	drunk	(pantapasi methuōn),	on	account	of	
his	senses	being	blocked,	is	unable	to	bear	the	heaviness,	does	not	judge	[at	
all],	and	so	because	he	does	not	judge,	he	is	not	behaving	badly,	but	one	who	
is	tipsy	judges	but	on	account	of	the	wine,	judges	badly	so	that	he	behaves	
badly.	And	so	he	is	just	like	Satyrus	of	Clazomenae	who	was	fond	of	abuse	
and	so	when	he	was	defendant	in	a	lawsuit,	in	order	that	he	might	speak	to	
the	matter	at	hand	and	not	be	abusive,	they	blocked	his	ears	so	that	since	he	
would	not	hear,	he	would	also	not	turn	to	abuse.	But	as	his	adversary	was	
about	to	stop,	they	uncovered	them	and	he,	having	heard	but	a	few	words,	
could	not	keep	away	from	speaking	badly	because	he	could	now	perceive	but	
judge	only	badly”	(875a29–875a40).	
to	what	merely	appears	to	be	the	case	—	she	takes	her	dreams	at	their	
face	value.69 
When	Aristotle	then	says	that	some	agents,	including	uncontrolled	
ones,	“follow	phantasia”	in	their	actions	(1150b25–28),	he	means	that	
they	act	on	the	basis	of	how	things	appear	to	them,	rather	than	on	the	
basis	of	any	reasons	(over	and	above	the	appearance)	that	they	would	
have	for	their	actions.70	In	order	to	make	sense	of	this	idea,	we	need	to	
distinguish	between	reasons	in	a	broad	or	loose	sense	and	reasons	in	
the	strict	sense.	In	the	loose	sense,	the	uncontrolled	agent	has	reasons	
to	do	what	she	does	when	she	acts	without	control.	She	has	a	desire	
for	 some	pleasure	 (i. e.,	 her	 appetite)	 and	 it	 appears	 to	 her	 that	 the	
desire	can	be	satisfied.	But	simply	having	a	desire	for	something	and	
it	appearing	to	be	the	case	that	now	is	the	time	and	place	to	satisfy	it	
are	not	“reasons”	for	acting	in	the	strict	sense.	Reasons	for	believing	or	
doing	something	in	the	strict	sense	require	that	one	recognizes	some-
thing	as	making	one’s	belief	believable	or	one’s	(proposed)	action	ad-
visable	independently	of	one’s	desire	to	believe	it	or	to	do	it.	
In	the	case	of	belief,	this	requirement	is	clearly	discernible	in	the	
passage	from	the	De Insomniis quoted	above.	The	judgment	that	what	
appears	to	one	is	false	(say,	that	Coriscus	is	there)	is	made	on	the	ba-
sis	of	one’s	knowledge	of	some	further	facts	about	Coriscus	or	one’s	
situation	that	make	the	belief	 in	the	reality	of	the	appearance	of	Co-
riscus	untenable	(say,	that	one	has	just	seen	Coriscus	leave	the	town).	
This	 judgment	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 one’s	 desires	 concerning	Coris-
cus:	in	fact,	one	has	to	form	the	appropriate	belief	in	view	of	the	facts	
and	despite	the	appearance	(DA 427b21–2).	This	contrasts	with	cases	
(e. g.,	when	asleep)	 in	which	an	appearance	 is	accepted	without	any	
69.	See	also	Insomn.	460a32–b27;	461a25–462a8;	and	485b15–25.
70.	As	Schofield	(1991,	270–1)	says,	“It	is	evidently	because	sleep	and	fever	impair	
the	operation	of	our	faculties	in	general,	leaving	phantasia alone	efficacious,	
that	the	will	has	no	control	over	what	appears	to	us	in	such	conditions.”	In	
the	De Insomniis 460b3ff,	Aristotle	asserts	that	the	same	account	is	true	also	
of	those	who	are	in	love,	have	appetites,	are	angry,	have	fever,	or	are	sick.	De 
Somno’s	discussion (456b28–457a21)	of	the	effects	of	various	soporific	agents	
like	wine	or	poppy	yields	the	same	result	for	those	who	are	drunk	or	drugged.	
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agent’s	decision	to	have	any	traction,	the	agent	must	have	and	must	be	
actively	aware	of	the	reasons	that	explain	to	her	why	the	unpleasant	
action	that	she	decides	on	(say,	refraining	from	eating	sweets)	is	good	
(over	and	above	pleasure)	and	good	for	her.
This	requirement	comes	out	most	clearly	in	an	important	passage	
in	EE 2.10	wherein	Aristotle	tells	us	that	human	beings	are	sometimes	
in	states	in	which	they	cannot	make	or	have	active	decisions	because	
they	cannot,	 in	 those	states,	deliberate.	Although	Aristotle	does	not	
say	what	kinds	of	states	these	are,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	he	
means	the	states	mentioned	in	the	passages	cited	above,	such	as	being	
drunk,	mad,	asleep,	or	in	the	grip	of	emotions	or	non-rational	desires	
(including	being	uncontrolled):
(7)	So	decision	is	not	present	in	other	animals,	not	even	
at	 every	 period	 of	 [human]	 life,	 nor	 in	 a	 human	 being	
in	 all	 states:	 for	 neither	 is	 deliberation	 nor	 a	 supposi-
tion	about	the	why:	nothing	prevents	that	many	people	
might	well	have	a	belief	 (doxa)	about	whether	 to	do	or	
not	 to	 do	 something	 but	 [have	 it]	 not	 through	 reason-
ing (di’ logismou).	For	that	part	of	the	soul	is	deliberative	
which	is	capable	of	contemplating	a	cause:	for	that	for	the	
sake	of	which	is	one	of	the	causes	–	for	cause	is	anything	
because	of	which	[something	comes	about].	We	say	that	
cause	is	that	for	the	sake	of	which	something	is	or	comes	
to	be	—	for	example,	the	recovery	of	money	is	a	cause	of	
walking,	if	it	is	for	the	sake	of	that	that	a	man	walks.	That	
is	why	people	who	have	no	goal	(skopos)	before	them	are	
not	deliberative.	(EE 2.10,	1226b21–5)
In	the	passage,	Aristotle	connects	the	capacity	for	decisions	to	the	
ability	to	contemplate	(i. e.,	be	actively	aware	of)	a	cause	(which	in	the	
case	of	action	 just	 is,	 as	he	explains,	 the	 reason	 for	one’s	action)	as 
being	that	which	makes	and	explains	the	action	as	good	for	oneself.	
One	decides	on	an	action	because	one	believes	that	the	action	stands	
previously	 made	 because	 she	 temporarily	 cannot	 employ	 reasoned	
oversight	over	her	situation	and	actions.	The	 temporary	suspension	
of	reason	leads	her	to	move	from	sticking	to	that	decision	to	following	
the	appearance	of	pleasure	(i. e.,	to	following	her	phantasia)	which	is	
now	accepted	at	its	face	value.
But	why	does	the	temporary	suspension	of	one’s	power	of	reason-
ing	make	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	decision	 ineffectual?	Why	cannot	
the	agent	simply	go	on	sticking	to	it?	It	does	so	because	decisions	are	
essentially	connected	to	deliberation	and	so	to	having	and	being	ac-
tively aware	of	the	reasons	for	one’s	action	as	what	makes	the	action	
good	for	oneself.	In	principle,	of	course,	even	pleasure	could	serve	as	
the	relevant	reason.	But	in	the	case	of	lack	of	control,	the	uncontrolled	
agent’s	decision	(i. e.,	decision	against	which	the	agent	acts)	is	charac-
terized	by	the	fact	that	in	making	it,	the	uncontrolled	agent	decided	to	
act	on	the	basis	of	reasons	that	were	independent	of	her	non-rational	
desires	and	feelings	of	pleasure.	In	fact,	they	were	contrary	to	those	de-
sires	and	so	also	contrary	to	what	she	finds	pleasant.	This	means	that	
the	decision	must	have	been	made	with	a	view	to	some	good	(such	as	
health	or	honor)	that	the	agent	has	adopted	(and	that	she	aims	at)	on	
other	grounds	than	pleasure	since,	in	the	other	case,	it	would	not	be	a	
decision	contrary	to	her	desires.72	But	in	order	to	adopt	X	as	one’s	end	
independently	of	one’s	non-rational	desires,	one	must	have	 reasons	
(other	than	mere	pleasure)	that	identify	what	it	is	about	X	that	makes	
it	 good	 and	 good	 for	 oneself.	 For	 example,	 in	 order	 for	 one	 to	 aim	
at	justice	independently	of	pleasures	or	pains	associated	with	just	or	
unjust	behavior,	one	must	have	some	reasons	 for	believing	 that	 jus-
tice	is	good	and	good	for	oneself	(DA	3.10,	433a9–26).	Otherwise,	in	
the	absence	of	some	pleasant	(or	painful)	consequences,	one	would	
have	no	motivation	to	pursue	justice.	A	mere	claim	of	the	form	“justice	
is	 good”	 is	 not	motivational	 unless	 it	 is	 either	 connected	with	 plea-
sures	(rewards)	and	pains	(punishments)	or	with	reasons	that	make	it	
clear	why	justice	is	good	for	oneself.	So,	in	order	for	the	uncontrolled	
72.	 In	that	other	case,	we	could	have	a	clash	between	two	different	pleasant	op-
tions,	but	not	a	case	of	lack	of	control.
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uncontrolled	agent	acts	without	control	since,	as	his	analogy	tells	us,	
the	agent’s	reasoning	power	is	suspended	across	the	board.
2.4. Knowledge vs. experience
Although	a	disablement	of	reason	of	this	sort	has	direct	consequenc-
es	for	the	agent’s	ability	to	be	motivated	by	goodness	(as	opposed	to	
mere	 pleasure),	 it	 has	 far	 less	 serious	 consequences	 for	 the	 agent’s	
ability	 to	act	 in	cognitively	complex	ways.	 In	other	words,	although	
the	agent	needs	to	be	able	to	grasp	and	be	actively	aware	of	reasons	
for	her	decision	in	order	to	stick	to	and	act	from	it,	she	does	not	need	
to	grasp	and	be	actively	aware	of	the	reasons	why	certain	ways	of	act-
ing	or	doing	things	lead	to	some	desired	results	in	order	to	act	so	as	
to	achieve	those	results.73	It	will	be	helpful	to	distinguish	two	ways	of	
finding	an	action	useful	which	do	not	involve	the	grasp	of	the	“why”	
but	which	 nevertheless	 involve	 awareness	 of	 how	 one	 can	 achieve	
some	desired	goal.
At	the	most	basic	level	(BL),	one	can	become	aware,	on	the	basis	
of	 one’s	 experience,	 that	 doing	 certain	 things	 reliably	 leads	 to	 some	
desired	result	while,	at	the	same	time,	not	having	any	conceptual	grasp	
of	the	connection	between	the	result	and	one’s	action.	This	way	of	find-
ing	an	action	useful	is	available	even	to	small	children	or	animals.	So,	a	
73.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Aristotle	 is	 happy	 to	 allow	 that	 some	 agents	 can	
stick	to	their	decisions	even while	their	reasoning	power	is	suspended.	But	
in	 such	 a	 case,	 they	 are	not	 strictly	 speaking	 acting	on	 the	decision	 itself	
(i. e.,	they	are	not	acting	from reason).	Rather,	they	are	acting	in	such	a	way	
because	they	enjoy something	that	acting	in	such	a	way	brings,	such	as	vic-
tory	 in	 contests.	These	are	especially	 the	 stubborn	people	 (ischurognōmes)	
who	superficially	resemble	the	self-controlled	people	but	differ	from	them	
precisely	because	they	do	not	act	on	their	decisions	themselves	but	stick	to	
them	only	for	the	sake	of	some	pleasure	which	is	gained	by	so	acting	and	
which	is	incidental	to	the	decision	itself.	Thus	they	are	in	fact	a	kind	of	un-
controlled	people.	See	NE 7.9,	1151b4–17.	One	can	also	imagine	a	scenario	
in	which	one’s	reason	becomes	disabled	on	account	of	one’s	emotions	(say,	
anger)	but,	despite	that,	one	does	not	end	up	acting	against	one’s	decision	
or	knowledge	because	one’s	experience	(i. e.,	what	one	finds	pleasant)	just	is	
what	one	thinks	is	good	in	the	first	place.	This	would	be	the	case	of	a	virtu-
ous	person	who	can	rely	on	her	sensibilities	to	not	lead	her	astray	even	while	
her	rational	thinking	is	inhibited.
in	the	right	relation	to	some	goal	one	has	and	the	nature	of	the	goal	
provides	one	with	 reasons	 to	perform	 this (rather	 than	 some	other)	
action.	For	example,	 if	one	wants	 to	promote	one’s	health,	 then	one	
needs	to	start	from	a	conception	of	what	health	is	(its	nature),	in	order	
to	figure	out	what	action,	if	any,	could	be	taken.	In	the	following	pas-
sage	from	the	Metaphysics 7.7,	Aristotle	makes	clear	that	deliberation	
involves,	at	each	step,	the	recognition	of	the	salient	or	essential	feature	
(or	features)	of	what	it	is	that	one	plans	to	achieve	and	an	appropriate	
selection	of	the	means	to	achieve	it:
(8)	All	 other	 [i. e.,	 non-natural]	 comings-to-be	 (geneseis)	
are	 called	 productions	 (poiēseis).	 And	 all	 productions	
are	either	 from	art	 (apo technēs) or	 from	a	 capacity	 (apo 
dunameōs)	 or	 from	 thought	 (apo dianoias).	 ….from	 art	
come	 to	be	 the	 things	of	which	 the	 form	 is	 in	 the	 soul.	
By	form	I	mean	the	essence	of	each	thing	and	its	primary	
substance.	…health	is	the	ratio	(logos) and	the	knowledge	
(epistēmē) in	the	soul.	The	healthy	thing,	then,	comes	to	
be	as	 the	 result	of	 the	 following	 train	of	 thought:	 since	
this is	health,	 if	 the	 thing	 is	 to	be	healthy	 this must	first	
be	present,	e. g.	a	uniform	state	of	body,	and	if	 this	 is	 to	
be	present,	there	must	be	heat;	and	one	goes	on	always	
thinking	 in	 this	way	until	 one	brings	 the	matter	 to	 a	fi-
nal	step	which	he	himself	can	produce.	Then	the	process	
(kinēsis) from	this	point	onward,	i. e.	the	process	towards	
health,	is	called	production.	(Met.	7.7,	1032a28–b11)
Thus	decisions	that	rest	on	more	than	an	appearance	of	pleasure	de-
pend	for	their	motivational	power	on	the	agent’s	grasp	of	the	reason(s)	
why	the	action	on	which	she	decides	is	good	both	in	the	sense	of	being	
good	for	some	desired	goal	as	well	as	in	the	sense	of	being	good	for	
the	agent	as	being	done	for	that	goal.	But	it	is	precisely	the	ability	to	
grasp	such	reasons	that	is,	according	to	Aristotle,	suspended	while	an	
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tasiai (Mem. 451a14–7).	Once	 one	 accumulates	many	memories	 of	 a	
certain	 sort,	 they	 give	 rise	 to	 experience	 (Post. An.100a2–5).	 Experi-
ence	 is,	 then,	 a	 certain	 kind	of	 acquaintance	 or	 recognition	 (gnōsis)	
which	arises	once	one	accumulates	sufficient	amount	of	memories	of	
the	same	thing	and	formulates	thoughts	(Met. 981a5–7).	
The	simplest	example	of	experience	at	work	involves	identification	
of	something	that	one	perceives.	For	example,	seeing	a	figure	resem-
bling	Coriscus,	one	forms	the	belief	that	there	is	Coriscus	approaching.	
This	judgment	is	not	the	work	of	reason	since	it	does	not	involve	any	
inference.75	It	is	achieved	through	the	application	of	one’s	memories	
to	what	one	perceives	on	the	basis	of	similarity.76	But	the	build-up	of	
experience	 leads	to	more	than	just	 the	ability	 to	 identify	 things	one	
perceives.	It	also	results	in	the	formulation	of	general	thoughts	(such	
as	“light	meats	are	healthy”)	and	rules	(such	as	“when	having	a	head-
ache,	take	a	red	pill”).	In	fact,	human	experience	can	achieve	such	high	
degree	of	 complexity	 and	precision	 that	 it	 is,	 for	 practical	 purposes,	
almost	equivalent	to	knowledge	or	understanding.	As	Aristotle	says:	
“With	a	view	to	action	experience	does	not	seem	to	differ	 from	craft,	
and	we	even	see	those	with	experience	succeeding	more	than	those	
who	have	theory	without	experience”	(Met. 981a13–5).77 
In	the	following	passage,	Aristotle	explicitly	distinguishes	between	
grasping	something	in	the	light	of	mere	experience	and	grasping	it	in	
the	light	of	knowledge	(i. e.,	grasping	the	reason	why):
(9)	For	to	have	a	supposition	that	when	Callias	was	sick	
of	this	disease	this	benefitted	him,	and	so	also	to	Socrates	
and	 so	 in	many	 individual	 cases,	 is	 a	matter	 of	 experi-
ence.	But	to	suppose	that	it	benefitted	all	people	of	a	cer-
tain	kind,	marked	off	according	to	one	form,	when	they	
75.	 See	Cashdollar	(1973)	for	a	discussion	of	non-rational	cognitive	achievements.
76.	 In	Mem.	 451b10–452a4	 Aristotle	 introduces	 three	ways	 or	 rules	 of	 associa-
tion	that	govern	the	orderings	of	one’s	phantasiai: similarity,	opposition,	and	
proximity.	
77.	 A	similar	point	is	made	also	at	NE 6.7,	1141b15–23.
cat	can	discover	that	repeated	meowing	near	the	pantry	leads	to	food	
and	so	act	that	way	any	time	she	desires	food.	But	we	usually	do	not	
suppose	that	the	cat	grasps	her	meowing	as a	means	to	her	goal	or	that	
she	grasps anything	about	the	reason	why	it	leads	to	the	usual	result.	
At	a	more	complex	level	(CL),	one	can	learn	that	a	certain	action	
leads	 to	 a	 desired	 result	 and	 grasp,	 in	 addition,	 that	 the	 action	 is	 a	
means	to	that	result.	In	this	case,	one	grasps	the	action	as useful.	This	
stage	 is	 a	 vast	 improvement	 over	 the	 previous	 one	 since	 one	 now	
becomes	 aware	 that	 one	 could	 try	 other	means	 should	 the	 current	
one	 that	 one	uses	 become	 ineffectual.	 In	 the	basic	 case,	we	merely	
described	a	child	or	an	animal	as	 thinking	or	 treating	something	as	
useful	without	implying	that	it	was	grasped	by	the	child	or	the	animal	
as	such.	The	cat	does	not	grasp	the	meowing	as	a	means	to	her	end	
even	 though	 she	 acts	 that	way	—	she	does	not	 see	 it	 as	 one	 among	
various	possible	alternatives	of	getting	the	food.	Nevertheless,	notice	
that	even	at	this	more	complex	stage,	one	still	need	not	grasp	the	rea-
son	why the	action	is	useful	for	the	goal.	For	example,	one	might	think	
that	ibuprofen	is	a	means	to	relieving	headache	without	knowing	the	
reason	why	it	does	so.	The	fact	that	one	does	not	know	that	does	not	
prevent	one	from	alternating	the	means	should	ibuprofen	not	be	avail-
able	(say,	by	taking	acetaminophen).	
This	 second	 way	 (CL)	 of	 grasping	 something	 as	 useful	 (or	 as	 a	
means)	is	both	highly	complex	and,	according	to	Aristotle,	quite	com-
mon	 in	 human	 behavior.	On	 his	 view,	 human	 beings	 have	 at	 their	
disposal	a	sophisticated	system	of	memories	in	which	they	can	make	
complex	judgments	in	a	systematic	albeit	non-rational	way.	Aristotle	
calls	 this	system	“experience”	(empeiria).74	Experience	arises	 through	
repeated	perception	of	the	same	thing	and	subsequent	structured	ac-
cumulation	 of	 the	 corresponding	memories	 (Post.	An.100a2–5). The	
retained	sensory	impressions	that	constitute	one’s	memories	are	phan-
74.	The	 relevant	 aspects	 of	Aristotle’s	 theory	 of	 non-rational	 cognition	 can	be	
gleaned	from	Met. 1.1	and	Post. An. 2.19.	In	my	explanation	of	Aristotle’s	theory	
of	phantasia and	experience,	I	follow	Frede	(1996).	For	an	account	of	phantasia 
consistent	with	my	account	of	lack	of	control,	see	Lorenz	(2009,	148–73).
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reason,	she	temporarily	cannot	act	on	her	decision	since	acting	on	her	
decision	requires	 that	she	 is	actively	grasping	the	reasons	on	which	
her	decision	 is	based	—	that	 is,	 she	 is	able	 to	contemplate	 the	cause.	
In	the	absence	of	such	an	active	grasp,	her	decision	ceases	to	be	an	
active	conative	psychological	state	and	the	way	is	cleared	for	bad	ap-
petite	 to	 issue	 in	action.	 In	acting	on	her	appetite,	 the	uncontrolled	
agent	“follows	phantasia”	both	 in	 the	sense	that	she	 is	acting	on	the	
pleasant	prospect	that	aroused	her	appetite,	and	in	the	sense	that	her	
active	cognition	is	now	limited	to	various	forms	of	non-rational	cogni-
tion	(such	as	experience).	These	forms	of	cognition	are	rich	enough	to	
enable	her	to	act	in	a	way	she	desires,	but	they	lack	the	ability	evalu-
ate	the	uncontrolled	course	of	action	independently	of	her	appetitive	
desire.	Thus	she	now	acts	according	to	how	the	situation	appears	to	
her	—	namely,	as	pleasant.78 
If	 the	 interpretation	 so	 far	 is	 along	 the	 right	 lines,	 then	Aristotle	
distinguishes	between,	on	the	one	hand,	merely	having	thoughts	(or	
a	 train	of	 thoughts)	 and,	on	 the	other	hand,	having	 thoughts	while	
also	contemplating	the	explanatory	and	inferential	or	conceptual	con-
nections	between	one’s	 thoughts	 (or	propositional	contents).	 In	oth-
er	words,	the	distinction	he	is	drawing,	in	introducing	the	third	way	
of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	 is	not	between	possessing	some	
knowledge	but	not	having	it	currently	in	mind	(as	when	one	knows	
some	fact	but	one	is	not	attending	to	it	at	the	moment)	and	possessing	
and	also	having	it	currently	in	mind.	Rather,	the	distinction	is	between	
78.	Destrée	(2007)	argues	that	the	motivating	force	of	a	phantasia is	given	by	the	
degree	of	pleasure	that	is	associated	with	it.	The	uncontrolled	agent	is	char-
acterized	by	having	a	strong	phantasia aisthêtikê	 (which,	on	Destrée’s	view,	
represents	 things	as	pleasant)	 and	a	weak	phantasia logistikē	 (which	 repre-
sents	things	as	good).	During	the	uncontrolled	action,	the	agent’s	faculty	of	
phantasia logistikē	 is	disabled	by	 the	strong	phantasia aisthêtikê.	His	view	is	
attractive	but	it	faces	a	number	of	problems.	In	DA 434a6–7,	which	contains	
the	reference	to	phantasia logistikē,	Aristotle	does	not	specify	its	content.	It	
might	 simply	be	a	 representation	of	different	 courses	of	 action	 to	oneself	
according	 to	 one’s	 deliberation	without	 representing	 them	 as	 good	—	that	
determination	can	still	be	the	work	of	rational	judgment.	It	is	also	not	clear	
that	phantasia logistikē is	a	separate	kind	or	faculty	of	phantasia which	can	be	
disabled	independently.
were	sick	of	this	disease	(for	example,	to	phlegmatic	or	
bilious	people	when	burning	with	fever),	 is	a	matter	of	
craft.	(Met. 981a7–13)
According	 to	 this	 passage,	 a	 person	 of	 experience	 can	 formulate	 a	
number	of	propositions,	such	as	“treatment	T	helped	Callias	when	he	
had	fever.”	He	can,	on	the	basis	of	these	propositions,	also	form	a	rule:	
“If	people	have	a	fever,	apply	treatment	T.”	An	experience-based	rule	of	
this	sort	provides	a	quick,	reliable,	and	clear	guidance	to	one’s	actions.	
On	this	account,	a	number	of	daily	activities	(including	those	associ-
ated	with	crafts	and	occupations)	do	not	require	any	exercise	of	reason	
in	the	strict	sense	in	which	it	 involves	deliberation	and	the	grasp	of	
reasons.	When	one	does	them,	one	does	them	on	the	basis	of	one’s	
acquired	habits	or	experience	(Met. 1.1,	981b5).	
It	is	crucial	to	recognize	that	the	temporary	suspension	of	reason	
that	Aristotle	attributes	 to	 the	uncontrolled	agent	during	her	uncon-
trolled	action	does	not	 concern	either	of	 these	 two	non-rational	 (in	
Aristotle’s	sense	of	the	term)	forms	of	practical	cognition	(BL	and	CL)	
since	neither	of	them	involves	an	active	grasp	of	the	reasons	in	the	strict	
sense	 for	 thinking	or	believing	 that	doing	something	would	 lead	 to	
some	desired	result.	In	this	sense,	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	draw	on	
all	her	experience	and,	in	fact,	on	all	her	already	acquired	knowledge	
that	does	not	require,	in	order	to	be	applied,	any	further	deliberative	
processes.	Thus,	although	she	cannot	deliberate	(in	the	strict	sense)	
during	her	uncontrolled	action,	she	can	nevertheless	think	about	how	
to	accomplish	her	goal	even	while	she	acts.	She	can	think	about	how	
to	achieve	 it	on	 the	basis	of	her	experience	 (just	 like	one	can	 think	
about	how	to	combine	spices	to	make	a	tasty	meal	without	engaging	
in	deliberation	about	it).	
It	is	time	for	a	quick	summary.	Aristotle	tells	us	that	when	the	un-
controlled	agent	acts	without	control,	she	is	like	people	who	are	mad,	
drunk,	or	 asleep	 insofar	 she	 temporarily	 cannot	exercise	her	knowl-
edge.	She	cannot	do	so	because	her	reasoning	power	has	been	tempo-
rarily	disabled	by	her	appetite.	As	a	consequence	of	the	disablement	of	
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That	my	 interpretation	 so	 far	 is	 along	 the	 right	 lines	 is	well	 sup-
ported	by	the	next	passage	in	NE 7.3	in	which	Aristotle	compares	un-
controlled	agents	to	early	learners:
(10)	 Saying	 words	 that	 come	 from	 knowledge	 proves	
nothing.	 For	 people	 in	 these	 affective	 states	 can	 recite	
the	demonstrations	and	verses	of	Empedocles,	and	those	
who	have	 learned	something	for	 the	first	 time	string	to-
gether	words,	but	do	not	yet	know	it.	For	they	must	ab-
sorb	it	and	that	requires	time.	In	this	way	one	must	sup-
pose	also	uncontrolled	people	speak,	just	like	actors	do.	
(NE 7.3,	1147a18–24)
The	 passage	 considers	 an	 obvious	 objection	 to	 the	 previous	 claim	
that	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	state	of	mind	is	like	that	of	people	who	
are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep:	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	report	not	just	
what	she	is	doing,	but	also	her	previous	deliberation	and	its	conclu-
sion	(and	so	the	content	of	her	decision)	that	what	she	does	is	wrong.	
There	thus	seems	to	be	a	reason	to	believe	that	she	knows	what	she	is	
doing	and	knows that	it	is	bad.
Aristotle	replies	that	merely	saying	words	that	might	express	some-
thing	is	not	a	sign	of	knowledge	or	understanding.	People	affected	in	
certain	ways	(for	example,	drunk	or	mad)	can	recite	verses	without	
having	 any	 understanding	 of	what	 they	 say.	 Similarly,	 people	who	
have	 begun	 to	 learn	 something	 can	 string	 the	words	 together	 that	
express	what	they	are	learning,	but	be	doing	so	without	having	real	
understanding	of	what	they	say.	Obviously,	it	is	not	the	case	that	an	
early	learner	does	not	understand	what	she	is	saying	at all.	A	student	
can	write	out	Kant’s	argument	leading	to	the	formulation	of	the	Cat-
egorical	Imperative.	She	might	also	very	well	understand	the	words	
that	Kant	uses	 to	 formulate	 the	 Imperative	and	 in	 fact,	 even	under-
stand	the	individual	claims.	And	she	can	use	this	knowledge	to	report	
it	(say,	on	an	exam).	But	being	able	to	do	this	does	not	presuppose	
having	some	information	or	thought	currently	in	mind	but	not	being	
able	to	contemplate	or	use	it	as knowledge	(for	example,	as	standing	
in	explanatory	and/or	conceptual	connection	to	other	thoughts)	and	
having	this	information	in	mind	and	also	being	able	to	attend	to	it	as 
knowledge	 in	 this	 sense.79	 It	 is	only	 this	 latter,	quite	specific	way	of	
manipulating	thoughts	or	propositional	contents	that	Aristotle	denies	
to	the	uncontrolled	agent	during	the	uncontrolled	action.	The	former	
case	is,	as	I	tried	to	show,	compatible	with	the	agent	still	being	capable	
of	highly	complex	cognitive	operations	(ones	we	would	normally	call	
thinking)	and	might	well	be,	as	far	as	Aristotle	is	concerned,	even	the	
dominant	way	in	which	we	normally	operate.80	Normally,	however,	we	
are	capable	of	rational	control	over	such	behavior	whereas	in	the	case	
of	lack	of	control,	the	rational	oversight	is	suspended.
It	 is	sometimes	objected,	to	the	kind	of	account	that	I	have	been	
developing,	that	it	implies	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	does	not	know	
what	she	is	doing	when	she	acts	without	control.	It	should	be	clear	by	
now	that	this	objection	can	be	true	or	false,	depending	on	how	one	
understands	 the	phrase	“she	does	not	know.”	 If	 it	means	 that	she	at	
the	moment	lacks	understanding	—	an	intellectual	grasp	—	of	the	reason	
why	she	should	or	should	not	be	doing	what	she	does,	then	the	objec-
tion	is	correct	but	it	does	not	succeed	as	an	objection	since	Aristotle	
would	agree	with	it.	But	if	it	means	that	she	does	not	know	what	she	is	
doing	in	the	sense	that	she	would	not	be	able	to	tell	what	actions	she	
is	performing	and	what	she	is	trying	to	achieve,	the	objection	is	false. 
79.	Since	for	Aristotle	having	knowledge	ordinarily	denotes	the	latter	condition	
(i. e.,	 having	understanding),	 he	 can	 and	does	 express	 this	 thought	 by	 say-
ing	 that	 the	agent	both	has	knowledge	 in	a	way,	but	also	does	not	have	 it	
(1147a12–3).
80.	Leibniz held	a	view	similar.	In	Principes de la Nature et de la Grace,	he	claims	
that	the	difference	between	reason	strictly	speaking	and	a	certain	semblance	
of	reason	(which	is	an	exercise	of	a	highly	developed	capacity	of	memory)	
is	 that	 the	 former,	 but	 not	 the	 latter,	 is	 concerned	with	 causes	 and	 expla-
nations.	The	non-rational	cognition	 is	common	to	both	human	beings	and	
animals,	and	we	rely	on	it	most	of	the	time.	See:	G.	W.	Leibniz,	Die philoso-
phischen Schriften,	vol.	VI,	edited	by	C.	I.	Gerhardt.	(Berlin,	1875–90),	reprint:	
Hildesheim,	1965,	600.
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is	tempted	by	her	uncontrolled	desire	and	might	well	deliberate	about	
what	it	would	take	to	satisfy	it	and	whether	satisfying	it	would	be	per-
missible.81	She	can	achieve	a	high	level	of	sophistication	in	figuring	out	
the	ways	in	which	she	can	do	so,	being	an	agent	exhibiting	the	quality	
of	cleverness	(deinotēs),	which	is	the	ability	to	find	out	how	to	promote	
a	goal	quite	in	general	(EN 6.12,	1144a25–8),	independently	of	its	being	
good	or	bad.	After	all,	if	there	was	a	way	to	satisfy	her	desires	in	a	way	
that	would	be	acceptable	to	reason,	she	could	have	it	both	ways	and	
so	she	has	motivation	 to	 invest	energy	 into	such	 thought	processes.	
This	much	is	clear	both	from	NE 6.9,	1142b18–22	itself,	as	well	as	from	
NE 7.10,	1152a7–16	where	lack	of	control	is	said	to	be	often	associated	
with	cleverness.	
However,	 such	 deliberation	 presumably	 occurs	 before she	 acts	
without	control	(since	the	point	of	deliberation	of	any	sort	is	to	figure	
out	what	to	do	before	one	acts)	and	the	result	of	her	deliberation	as	a	
whole	is	a	decision	not to	satisfy	that	desire.	The	disablement	of	reason	
that	I	have	been	arguing	Aristotle	attributes	to	the	uncontrolled	agent	
concerns	only	the	time	during	which	the	agent	acts	without	control,	
not	the	time	before	 the	action	during	which	deliberation	occurs.	 It	 is	
aimed	to	explain	how	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	act	against	her	deci-
sion	without	having	reconsidered	the	decision.	This	disablement	does	
not	prohibit	the	uncontrolled	agent	from	making	use	of	her	previous	
deliberation	even	during	the	uncontrolled	action,	although	it	tempo-
rarily	prevents	her	from	using	it	as part	of	her	overall	knowledge	(in	
the	way	I	already	explained).
It	should	also	be	noted	that	my	view	is	compatible	with	the	agent	
interrupting her	uncontrolled	action	in	order	to	deliberate	about	how	
to	 get	 to	her	 goal.	 This	 can	happen	 if	 her	 experience	 turns	out	not	
to	be	sufficient	(e. g.,	if	she	comes	across	unexpected	problems).	This	
might	in	fact	be	quite	a	common	occurrence	and	Aristotle’s	theory	can	
accommodate	it.	But	such	deliberation	would	presumably	trigger	her	
decision	(since	it	would	trigger	her	reasoning	capacity)	and	so	it	might	
81.	 See	NE 3.11,	1119a12–21	for	an	example	of	deliberation	of	this	sort.
that	she	in	fact	understands	the	argument	and	the	logical	connection	
between	its	steps.	
The	 uncontrolled	 agent,	 while	 acting	 without	 control,	 is	 like	 an	
early	learner	insofar	as	she	has	knowledge	but	is	unable	to	use	it	as 
knowledge	(in	the	sense	I	explained	above).	She	knows	what	her	goal	
is	and	she	can	draw	on	her	experience	to	get	to	that	goal.	What	she	
cannot	 do,	when	 she	 acts	without	 control,	 is	 to	 reflect	 on	whether	
there	are	any	reasons	to	get	what	she	wants.	She	can	perfectly	well	say,	
e. g.	“this	thing	here	is	sweet	and	I	should	not	eat	it	since	I	have	decided	
not	to	eat	sweets”	and	perfectly	well	understand	the	meaning	of	what	
she	is	saying.	But	this	thought	will	not	count	as	a	piece	of	knowledge, 
or	as	a	piece	of	knowledge	that	is	actively	attended	to,	since	when	she	
says	it,	she	is	not	grasping	the	prohibition	to	eat	sweet	things	as	being	
implied	by	her	knowledge.	She	is	like	an	early	learner	who	recites	the	
correct	steps	in	a	proof,	but	does	not	grasp	how	one	step	follows	from	
another.	
This	is,	in	essence,	the	meaning	of	Aristotle’s	analogy	between	the	
uncontrolled	agent	and	people	who	are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep.	If	this	
interpretation	 is	 along	 the	 right	 lines,	 it	 suggests	 that	Aristotle	 con-
ceives	of	reason	and	thinking	(and	so	of	rationally	grounded	and	guid-
ed	action)	as	a	highly	specific	ability	that	binds	together	the	ability	to	
construct	and	understand	rational	explanations	and	reasons	and	the	
ability	to	be	motivated	to	act	by	one’s	understanding	of	such	explana-
tions	and	reasons	—	i. e.,	to	make	and	execute	decisions.	Although	this	
way	of	 thinking	and	acting	 is	 specifically	human,	 it	 is	not	 the	usual	
modus operandi	of	human	beings.	Most	people,	most	of	the	time,	simply	
follow	their	feelings	(NE 1.3,	1095a2–10).	
Before	moving	on,	I	have	to	address	a	worry	about	my	interpretation	
that	an	attentive	reader	of	the	NE might	have.	Aristotle	tells	us	that	the	
uncontrolled	agent	can	deliberate	about	her	uncontrolled	desire	(NE 
6.9,	1142b18–22)	and	one	might	wonder	how	this	claim	fits	with	my	
interpretation.	The	answer	is	that	it	fits	well	since,	on	my	view,	there	
is	no	reason	to	deny	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	deliberate	about	
her	uncontrolled	desire.	The	uncontrolled	agent	can	and	presumably	
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perception,	memory	or	anticipation	is	always	accompanied	by	“heating	
and	chilling”	(MA 8,	701a1).	Hence,	all	feelings	and	non-rational	desires	
involve	the	processes	of	heating	and	chilling	(whatever	the	precise	me-
chanics	of	these	processes	are),	even	though,	as	Aristotle	remarks,	this	
can	escape	notice	if	they	are	small	enough.	They	are	all	bodily	altera-
tions	(MA 7,	701b16–32).82	But	it	 is	also	precisely	these	kinds	of	mate-
rial	or	physiological	processes	that	are	the	causes	of	sleep,	madness,	or	
drunkenness	and,	hence,	also	of	 the	 incapacitations	of	one’s	 rational	
capacities	that	Aristotle	describes	in	the	De Somno and	De Insomniis. 
Aristotle’s	 thought,	 then,	 is	 that	 the	disablement	of	 reason	 in	un-
controlled	 action	 is	 brought	 about	by	 the	material	 processes	 associ-
ated	with	the	agent’s	occurrent	appetites.	The	uncontrolled	agent	does	
not	choose	to	do	what	the	non-rational	desire	inclines	her	to	do.	She	
does	not	choose	to	abandon	her	decision	and	act	on	her	bad	desire.	
She	acts	on	a	desire	(the	bad	one)	that	was	present	all	along	and	this	
desire,	in	and	of	itself,	causes	her	action.	But	she	does	not	perform	any	
mental	act	that	would	constitute	her	choosing	to	do	so	(or	rejecting	
her	decision).	This	feature	of	Aristotle’s	theory	makes	it	significantly	
different	from	akratic	or	weak-willed	action	as	it	is	traditionally	under-
stood	 in	 the	contemporary	 literature.	Ordinarily,	philosophers	 try	 to	
explain	why	one	would	choose,	form	an	intention,	or	draw	a	conclu-
sion	to	do	something	which	one	has	some	reasons	to	do	(since	one,	for	
example,	desires	it)	but	which	one	has	overriding	reasons	not	to	do.83 
Alternatively,	they	try	to	explain	why	one	re-evaluates	one’s	intentions	
when	confronted	by	the	very	temptations	that	one	intended	to	resist.84 
82.	See	also	Aristotle’s	famous	description	of	the	material	side	of	anger	as	“the	
boiling	of	the	blood	and	hot	matter	around	the	heart”	(DA 1.1,	403a29).
83.	For	example,	Bratman	(1979,	168)	describes	Sam,	a	weak-willed	agent,	who	
does	not	draw	the	inference	that	he	should	not	drink,	which	is	the	right	one	
in	view	of	his	own	evaluative	commitments,	“but,	rather,	focuses	his	attention	
on	the	former	evaluative	commitment	and	infers	 from	it	a	practical	conclu-
sion	in	favor	of	drinking.”	
84.	Richard	Holton	explains	weakness	of	will	(as	opposed	to	akrasia,	which	he	
understands	along	the	lines	explained	in	note	1	above)	as	involving	an	aban-
donment	of	a	resolution	not	to	act	on	one’s	future	inclinations.	See	in	Holton	
(1999,259).
enable	her	to	refrain	from	her	uncontrolled	action	or,	alternatively,	she	
can	succumb	again.	An	example	would	be	a	smoker	who	has	been	try-
ing	to	resist	his	urge	to	smoke	but	finally,	late	at	night,	gives	in	—	only	
to	discover	that	he	has	run	out	of	cigarettes.	When	he	tries	to	figure	
out	how	to	obtain	some,	he	is	forced	to	deliberate	(since	it	is	too	late	
to	use	any	of	the	usual	ways	to	obtain	them).	But	instead	of	deciding	
for	some	way	of	getting	them,	he	now	reinstates	his	commitment	not	
to	smoke.	Luck	helped	him	to	stick	to	it.
2.5. The transition from sticking to one’s decision to acting without control
Although	we	now	have	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 it	 is	 that	 the	 uncon-
trolled	agent	acts	during uncontrolled	action	(i. e.,	we	now	know	what	
his	state	of	mind	is),	we	still	do	not	know	why	such	temporary	suspen-
sion	occurs	 in	 the	first	place.	Why	does	 the	uncontrolled	agent	end	
up	in	a	condition	of	this	sort?	And	how	does	she	move	from	resisting	
and	sticking	to	the	decision	to	acting	without	control?	We	can	begin	
by	looking	at	what	Aristotle	says	about	the	causes	that	lead	to	the	tem-
porary	disablements	of	 reason	 in	 the	other	 conditions	he	mentions.	
Some	of	them	happen	as	parts	of	people’s	natural	day-cycle	(such	as	
sleep),	but	 some	are	 the	 results	of	various	external	 influences	or	 in-
ternal	 imbalances.	When	one	 reads	about	 the	causes	and	processes	
that	are	involved	in	the	transitions	from	being	in	possession	of	one’s	
rational	 faculties	 to	 their	disablement,	one	gets	 a	 story	 about	differ-
ent	flows	of	exhalations,	heat,	and	blood	in	one’s	body	that	cause	the	
disablement	 of	 one’s	 cognitive	 faculties	 (Insomn. 460b28–61a25,	De 
Somno 456a30–b28).	Sometimes	these	processes	are	caused	by	the	in-
take	of	food	(as	in	sleep),	sometimes	by	the	intake	of	wine	(as	in	being	
drunk),	sometimes	by	illness.	
As	Aristotle	sees	it,	all	emotions,	feelings,	and	non-rational	desires	
are	alterations	or	affections	that	come	about	because	of	thoughts,	phan-
tasiai,	or	perceptions that	present	to	one’s	consciousness	things	as	hav-
ing	certain	appropriate	motivational	features,	namely	as	being	pleasant	
or	 painful	 (MA 8,	 701b33–7).	 As	Aristotle	 further	 tells	 us,	 the	 cogni-
tion	of	something	as	pleasant	or	painful,	whether	it	comes	from	direct	
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(11)	Further,	one	could	also,	in	the	following	way,	look	sci-
entifically	(phusikōs)	at	the	cause.	For	one	belief	is	univer-
sal,	and	the	other	is	about	particulars,	of	which	perception	
is	in	control.85	When	one	[belief]	results	from	them,	it	is	
necessary	that	what	has	been	concluded	the	soul	asserts	
in	one	case,	and	in	the	case	of	[beliefs	about]	producing	
things	that	it	acts	[on	it]	immediately.	For	example,	if	ev-
erything	 sweet	must	 be	 tasted	 and	 this	 is	 sweet	 (some	
one	of	the	particulars),	it	is	necessary	for	one	able	[to	do	
it]	and	not	prevented	[from	doing	it]	at	the	same	time	to	
do	this.	(NE 7.3,	1147a24–31)
The	pattern	that	Aristotle	presents	as	explaining	both	action	and	the	
formation	 of	 beliefs	 contains	 two	 relevantly	 connected	 beliefs,	 one	
universal,	 one	 about	 particulars.	Once	 these	 two	 beliefs	 are	 put	 to-
gether,	that	is,	once	they	result	in	one	belief,	the	agent	who	holds	the	
beliefs	necessarily	asserts	and	believes	the	conclusion	immediately	or,	
in	the	case	of	beliefs	about	doing	things,	necessarily	acts	immediately	
(NE	7.3,	1147a26–8).
Why	does	Aristotle	think	that	once	two	such	beliefs	are	put	togeth-
er,	one	immediately	and	necessarily	acts?	In	order	to	explain	an	action,	
one	needs	 to	 show	how	 the	 action	 follows	 from	 the	 agent’s	 beliefs	
85.	There	 is	a	question	about	how	to	 translate	 “ἡ	μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ’ 
ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά ἐστιν”	(1147a24–5).	What	feminine	noun	is	to	
be	understood	with	the	article	ἡ, protasis	(proposition)	or	doxa	(belief)?	If	we	
take	it	to	be	protasis,	we	should	translate	“for	one	proposition	is	a	universal	
belief,	the	other	is	[a	belief]	about	particulars.”	Taking	it	the	other	way,	as	in	
my	translation,	we	get:	 “For	one	belief	 is	a	universal	belief.”	 I	do	not	 think	
that	much	hangs	on	this	issue	here.	The	sentence	says	in	the	first	clause	that	
whatever	the	subject	is,	is	a	belief.	This	issue	can	be	important	if	one	wants	
to	argue	 that	when	Aristotle	 later	 (at	 1147b9)	uses	 the	expression	 “the	 last	
proposition”	 (hē teleutaia protasis)	he	 refers	 to	 a	 conclusion	of	 the	practical	
syllogism.	For	if	we	take	the	noun	that	is	to	be	understood	with	the	feminine	
articles	here	 to	be	protasis,	one	could	argue	 that	Aristotle	means	 to	 say,	 in	
the	second	sentence,	“when	one	[proposition]	results	from	them…”	in	which	
case	Aristotle	would	be	referring	to	the	conclusion	as	to	a	proposition	(rather	
than,	as	in	my	translation,	a	belief).	That	would	be	a	good	precedent	for	the	
expression	at	1147b9.	
In	both	cases,	there	is	some	mental	act	the	akratic	or	weak-willed	agent	
performs	such	 that	 that	act	 (of	choosing,	 forming	an	 intention,	 refo-
cusing	one’s	attention,	etc.)	is	different	from	the	basic	desire	that	mo-
tivates	her	action.	This	additional	psychic	act	is	the	cause	of	the	akratic 
action.	On	Aristotle’s	 view,	however,	 the	original	 (bad)	desire	 is	 an	
impulse	which	can	cause	an	action	on	its	own	(NE	7.3,	1147a35).	
This	explains	why	Aristotle	is	not	trying	to	explain	(in	NE 7.3)	how	
or	why	it	is	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	moves	from	acting	on	or	main-
taining	the	good	decision	to	acting	on	the	bad	desire.	As	he	asserts,	
one	should	consult	the	physiologists	for	the	explanation	(1147b9).	On	
his	view,	there	is	an	explanation	of	how	it	happens,	but	that	explana-
tion	does	not	refer	to	any	psychological	acts	such	as	decisions.	Rather,	
the	 explanation	 is	 to	be	given	 in	 terms	of	 certain	physiological	 pro-
cesses.	Notice	 that	 these	physiological	processes	are	not,	as	he	says,	
peculiar	to	the	condition	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	since	they	are	also	
found	in	people	who	are	(in	the	process	of	becoming)	mad,	drunk	or	
asleep.	In	some	sense,	then,	we	have	not	yet	arrived	at	the	full	account	
of	uncontrolled	action	since	we	do	not	yet	have	the	right	sort	of	grasp	
of	the	difference	between	uncontrolled	actions	and	actions	performed	
in	other	non-standard	states	of	mind.	As	 I	will	now	argue,	Aristotle	
completes	his	account	and	finally	“captures”	the	uncontrolled	agent,	in	
the	second	part	of	NE 7.3.
3.  The second (phusikōs) part of Aristotle’s discussion (1147a25–b5).
Aristotle’s	“phusikōs”	discussion	of	lack	of	control	contains	the	passage	
that	has	been	 traditionally	 thought	 to	contain	 the	core	of	Aristotle’s	
theory	(1147a31–5).	The	passage	is	commonly	thought	to	describe	the	
state	of	the	mind	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	while	she	acts	without	con-
trol.	As	I	will	argue	in	this	section,	however,	the	passage	is	a	descrip-
tion	of	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	state	of	mind before	the	uncontrolled	
action.	 I	 begin	with	 a	 translation	of	 the	 immediately	 preceding	pas-
sage	in	which	Aristotle	introduces	the	“practical	syllogism”:
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nal	to	her	agency,	such	as	a	desire)	since	that	would	undermine	the	
very	purpose	of	the	pattern	as	a	device	for	explaining	actions.	It	would	
turn	into	a	mere	presentation	of	available	actions	with	no	explanatory	
power:	 the	agent	would	act	on	the	two	beliefs	unless she	would	not	
want	to	(or	unless	she	does	something	else).88
However,	an	alternative	 interpretation	of	 the	passage,	developed	
by	David	Charles,89	claims	that	the	agent	can	reach	the	conclusion,	yet	
still	refrain	from	acting	on	it	not	only	due	to	some	external	factor	of	
prevention,	but	also	due	to	some	internal	factor,	such	as	an	opposing	
desire.	Rather	than	entering	the	intricate	debates	about	what	the	pur-
pose	of	the	“practical	syllogism”	is,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	relatively	
simple	issue	of	the	sense	of	mē kōluomenon (not	being	prevented)	 in	
the	clause	 “it	 is	necessary	 for	one	able	 [to	do	 it]	and	not	prevented	
[from	doing	it]	at	the	same	time	to	do	this”	(1147a30–1).	Does	it	denote	
external	factors	only	or	can	it	include	factors	internal	to	one’s	agency	
(as	Charles’	interpretation	claims)?
The	verb	kōluein	can	have	the	general	meaning	of	one	thing	prevent-
ing	another	from	being	or	doing	something,	without	any	implication	
as	to	what	the	relationship	between	those	things	is.	This	use	is	present	
throughout	Aristotle’s	works,	as	 in	a	sentence	“even	 if	all	A’s	are	B’s,	
and	no	A	is	a	C,	nothing	prevents	some	B	to	be	C”	(e. g.,	APr. 30b15)	or	
when	he	says	that	wealthy	people	should	be	prevented	from	undertak-
ing	expensive	public	works	(Pol. 1309a17).	However,	in	the	context	of	
action	or	movement,	Aristotle	uses	the	term	to	denote	factors	that	pre-
vent	action	or	movement	and	are	external	to	what	is	properly	speak-
ing	 acting	 or	moving	 (e. g.,	De Caelo 311a20;	DA 404a14,	 417a28;	HA 
609b21;	Met. 1148a17).	Aristotle	thus	often	uses	it	to	describe	the	activ-
ity	of	something	that	compels	(De Motu 701a16;	Met. 1015a27,	1023a17)	
something	else	to	act	or	move	against	its	own	impulse.	As	he	makes	
clear	 in	both	NE 3.1	 (1110a1–4)	and	EE 2.7–8	(1223a11–4,	1224b12–4),	
what	compels	is	always	something	external	to	the	agent,	either	in	the	
88.	For	a	similar	point	see	Dahl	(1984,	162).
89.	Charles	(1984,	128–32).
or	desires	and	the	agent’s	perception	of	her	circumstances.	Aristotle	
makes	 use	 of	 two	 propositions,	 one	 of	which	 (the	 universal)	 repre-
sents	 the	 relevant	 feature	 of	 the	 agent’s	 state	 of	mind	 (for	 example,	
her	 decision),	 and	 the	 other	 (the	 particular)	 the	 relevant	 feature(s)	
of	the	environment	as	the	agent	perceives	it.	If	this	is	what	Aristotle	
has	in	mind,	then	it	is	obvious	why	an	action	follows	inevitably:	the	
two	premises	represent	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	action	
insofar	as	 the	agent’s	mind	or	soul	 is	concerned.	The	action	follows	
necessarily,	 just	as	belief	 in	a	conclusion	of	any	correct	syllogism	or	
inference	does.
On	this	understanding	of	the	practical	syllogism,86	the	action	could	
be	prevented	or	interrupted	in	two	ways:	either	the	agent	changes	her	
mind	(e. g.,	her	decision),	or	some	factor	external	to	the	agent’s	mind	
(i. e.,	to	her	beliefs	and	desires)	interferes	with	the	action.87	But	it	can-
not	be	prevented	by	any	factor	internal	to	the	agent’s	mind	(i. e.,	inter-
86.	In	 this	paper,	 I	do	not	defend	any	particular	 interpretation	of	what	has	be-
come	known	as	Aristotle’s	theory	of	the	practical	syllogism. My	interpretation	
of	the	syllogistic	machinery	in	passage	11	is	an	interpretation	of	that	particular	
passage	in	the	context	of	NE 7.3	where	it	seems	to	me	clearly	introduced	as	
a	way	of	explaining action	by	linking	one’s	relevant	universal	beliefs	(express-
ing	one’s	desires	or	judgments	about	what	one	should	or	should	not	do)	with	
one’s	awareness	or	perception	of	the	relevant	features	to	those	beliefs	in	one’s	
situation.	This	seems	to	me	to	be	the	explicit	content	of	the	passage.	In	the	
chapter,	the	syllogistic	apparatus	is	clearly	not	introduced	as	a	way	of	captur-
ing	deliberation	(the	particular	premise	 is	not	one	that	says	what	needs	to	
happen	 in	order	 to	 achieve	a	goal	 specified	 in	 the	universal	premise)	 and	
so	 the	 question	of	whether	 or	 not	 it	 can	be	 used	 that	way	 is	 not	 relevant	
here.	Similarly,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	agent	is	explicitly	connecting	the	
premises	together	so	as	to	make	an	inference	to	a	conclusion.	The	important	
point	 is	 that	 the	 syllogism	 is	 a	 rational	 reconstruction	 of	what	 cognitively	
must	have	happened	in	order	for	an	action	to	happen	even	if	the	agent	was	
not	explicitly	aware	of	it	(although	she	very	well	might	have	been)	as	consti-
tuting	an	inference.	For	a	discussion	of	the	various	interpretations	of	practical	
syllogism	see	Corcilius	(2008b)	and,	for	a	defense	of	an	interpretation	that	is	
largely	compatible	with	the	minimalistic	account	assumed	in	this	article,	see	
Corcilius	(2008c).
87.	 It	is	important	to	realize	that	“external	factors”	can	include	more	than	just	fac-
tors	physically	external	to	the	person	who	acts.	The	internal/external	distinc-
tion	needs	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	person’s	mind	(as	the	center	of	
agency).	I	will	explain	this	as	I	go	along.
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but	appetite	leads	one	on;	for	each	of	the	parts	can	move	
[the	body].91 (NE 7.3,	1147a31–5)
In	the	passage,	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	said	to	have	a	universal	belief,	
which	is	not	clearly	specified,	that	forbids	her	to	taste	something;	she	
has	a	(universal)	belief	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant;	and	she	has	
a	 particular	 belief	 that	 some	particular	 thing	 (that	 she	perceives)	 is	
sweet.	This	last	belief	is	said	to	be	active.	It	also	seems	that	the	agent	
has	drawn	a	conclusion	from	the	universal	belief	that	forbids	her	to	
taste	to	the	effect	that	she	should	avoid	the	sweet	thing.	But	the	agent	
has	an	appetite	that	goes	against	this	conclusion	and	leads	the	agent	
to	eat	the	sweet	thing.	The	appetite	is	said	to	be	able	to	move	the	agent	
to	do	this.
We	now	take	into	account	two	things.	First,	according	to	Aristotle	
at	1147a25–8,	if	both	premises	of	the	practical	syllogism	are	known	and	
actively	attended	to,	the	agent	necessarily	acts	according	to	them.	Sec-
ond,	in	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	clearly	
said	 to	be	drawing	the	good	conclusion	which	means	that	she	 is	ac-
tively	attending	to	both	premises.	It	follows	that	the	passage	cannot	be	
a	description	of	the	uncontrolled	action	itself	unless	Aristotle	is	gross-
ly	inconsistent.	It	must	describe	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	state	of	mind	
before	the	uncontrolled	action	when	she	is	not	yet	acting	without	con-
trol	(i. e.,	when	she	is	still	refraining	from	acting	on	her	appetite	and	
91.	 Alternatively:	“for	it	[viz.,	appetite]	can	move	each	of	the	parts.”	In	this	case	
“hekaston tōn moriōn”	would	refer	to	the	parts	of	the	body	that	are	responsible	
for	movement	 (i. e.,	 limbs).	This	means	 taking	hekaston to	be	 the	object	 of	
kinein. As	I	translated	the	sentence	above,	“each”	refers	to	the	parts	or	aspects	
of	the	soul	that	move	(appetite,	wish,	etc.).	In	this	case,	hekaston is	the	subject	
and	kinein is	interpreted	as	meaning	“to	cause	movement.” This	makes	more	
sense,	and	fits	the	context	well:	appetite	can	move	the	body,	just	as	decision	
(reason)	and	spirit	also	can	do.	There	does	not	seem	to	be	anything	in	the	
word	 order	 to	 prevent	 this	 translation.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 tōn moriōn	 as	
referring	to	rational	vs.	non-rational	part	of	 the	soul	seems	natural	 in	view	
of	 the	 frequent	usage	of	 that	 language	 in	both	EE (1219b20–20a3,	1224b26,	
1202a29)	and NE	(1102b4,	1102b19,	1139a9,	b12,	1144a9,	1145a3–7).
sense	of	being	external	physically	or	in	the	sense	of	being	external	to	
what	makes	the	agent	a	distinct,	individual	agent	(this	could	be	either	
the	agent’s	nature	as	a	being	of	a	certain	species	or	bodily	processes	
that	are	outside	of	her	control).	In	fact,	this	is	Aristotle’s	view	of	how	
the	agent’s	good	action	(sticking	to	her	decision)	gets	interrupted:	by	
factors	external	 to	her	own	agency	 (even	 if	 they	are	 internal	 to	her	
body)	—	namely,	 the	material	processes	associated	with	her	appetite.	
Finally,	 in	 its	passive	 form	(which	 is	 the	one	used	 in	our	passage	 in	
NE 7.3),	Aristotle	uses	the	word	exclusively	to	describe	external	factors	
of	prevention	(Phys. 208b12; De Caelo 307a10,	311b16;	MM	1198b15–6).	
This	is	a	strong	argument	in	favor	of	reading	the	occurrence	of	kōluein 
in	NE 7.3	in	the	way	I	have	suggested.	The	most	natural	reading	of	the	
passage,	then,	suggests	that	the	prevention	of	the	action	would	be	due	
to	a	factor	external to	the	agent’s	own	beliefs	and	desires,	in	the	way	I	
have	explained.90 
Aristotle	now	proceeds	 to	use	 the	pattern	 to	describe	 the	uncon-
trolled	agent’s	state	of	mind:
(12)	So	when	there	is	in	the	agent	on	the	one	hand	a	uni-
versal	 belief	 forbidding	 tasting,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand	
[the	belief]	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant,	and	this	is	
sweet,	and	this	latter	is	active,	appetite	happening	to	be	in	
the	agent,	then	on	the	one	hand	[belief]	says	to	avoid	this,	
90.	When	the	word	is	used	of	internal	factors	(as	in	NE 7.3),	Aristotle	uses	it	to	
denote	prohibitions	that	are	put	on	one’s	following	certain	emotions	but	not	
to	denote	being	prevented	from	following	them.	This	use	is	related	to	one	in	
which	laws	(1130b24)	or	shame	(1128b18)	as	external	factors	prohibit	one’s	
following	 certain	 states	 or	 emotions.	 This	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 expres-
sion	 is	used	 in	NE 7.3	 at	 1146a14	wherein	 reason	 (or	knowledge	or	belief)	
prohibits	one’s	following	of	one’s	appetites	(see	also	Plato,	Rep. 439c–440a)	
and,	similarly,	at	1147a31–4,	wherein	the	agent	is	prohibited	to	taste	by	one’s	
belief;	that	is,	prohibited	to	follow	an	appetite	(i. e.,	reason	does	not	prevent	
appetite	from	tasting	but,	rather,	forbids	or	prohibits	the	agent	to	taste).	The	
only	clear	use	of	the	word	for	emotions	preventing	reason	from	exercising	its	
own	activity	is	thus	in	MM 1208a10–23.	However,	in	that	passage	it	is	notable	
that	 reason	and	emotions	are	 treated	as	 two	agents	preventing	each	other	
from	doing	something	and	so	as	being	external	to	each	other.	
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so	on)	are	 in	 the	 same	state	with	 respect	 to	 their	knowledge.	What	
distinguishes	the	uncontrolled	agent	from	them	is	the	content	of	her	
mind	before	the	action	—	the	presence	of	a	good	decision	and	of	the	
contrary	appetite.	Although	this	conflicted	state	of	mind	is	shared	with	
other	agents	(such	as	the	self-controlled	one),	taken	together,	the	two	
states	of	mind	capture	the	essence	of	uncontrolled	action.	
The	interpretation	also	fits	nicely	with	the	immediately	following	
passage:
(13)	So	that	it	turns	out	that	a	man	acts	without	control	
in	a	way	as	a	result	of	reason	and	belief,	but	a	belief	that	
is	contrary	not	in	itself,	but	only	coincidentally	to	correct	
reason	—	for	 appetite	 is	 contrary,	 not	 the	 belief.	 This	 is	
also	why	animals	are	not	uncontrolled,	because	they	do	
not	have	universal	supposition,	but	only	appearance	and	
memory	of	particulars.	(EN 7.3.1147a35–1147b5)
The	passage	clearly	locates	the	cause	of	the	uncontrolled	action	in	the	
agent’s	appetite.	It	also	tells	us	that	the	there	is	a	sense	in	which	she	acts	
on	her	belief	—	presumably	the	belief	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant.	
This	belief	is,	of	course,	not	contrary	to	her	decision	since	it	does	not	say	
that	she	should	taste	everything	that	is	sweet	or	pleasant.	It	is	her	appe-
tite	that	is	contrary	to	her	decision.	Her	action,	however,	is	done	in	accor-
dance	with	this	belief	even	if	not	from	it	strictly	speaking	(hence,	the	“in	a	
way”	qualification).	This	is	because	she	acts	on	her	appetite	of	which	the	
belief	is	a	generalized	expression.	The	agent	realizes	and	so	believes	that	
everything	sweet	is	pleasant	for	her	but	since	she	does	not	believe	that	
everything	sweet	is	good	for	her,	she	does	not	decide	to	act	on	her	belief	
about	what	she	finds	pleasant.	Still,	once	she	acts	as	she	does,	the	belief	
that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant	comes	to	be	in	practical	contradiction	
to	her	good	decision	since	it	represents	the	appetite	on	which	she	acted.	
There	has	been	much	discussion	 in	 the	 literature	about	 the	final	
passage	of	 the	phusikōs discussion	 in	which	Aristotle	 refers	 to	some-
thing	he	calls	“the	last	proposition”:	
sticking	to	her	decision).92	This	 interpretation	not	only	 follows	from	
the	features	of	the	text,	but	also	offers	several	exegetical	advantages.
First,	we	get	rid	of	the	problem	of	inconsistency	between	the	“two-
syllogism”	passage	(which	claims	that	the	particular	premise	is	active	
and	tells	us	that	the	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion),	and	Aristotle’s	
claim	later	at	1147b9	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	when	acting	without	
control	does	not	have	(or	only	has	in	a	way)	the	final	proposition.	The	
latter	claim	concerns	(as it says)	the	uncontrolled	action	itself,	whereas	
the	two-syllogism	passage	describes	what	precedes	the	action.	Second,	
we	get	rid	of	the	inconsistency	between	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	
and	 the	 immediately	preceding	passage	 (NE 7.3,	 1147a25–31),	which	
asserts	 that	 if	 both	 premises	 are	 active,	 the	 agent	 acts	 according	 to	
them.	Since	the	“two-syllogism”	passage	describes	the	state	of	mind	
of	the	agent	before	her	uncontrolled	action,	the	agent	is	still	acting	ac-
cording	to	her	decision	and	so	drawing	the	good	conclusion.93 
Third,	it	complements,	in	an	essential	way,	the	third	way	of	having	
but	not	using	knowledge	which	pertains	to	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	
state	of	mind	during	the	action.	This	third	way	is	not	specific	to	the	un-
controlled	agent	—	people	in	other	mental	states	(drunk,	asleep,	and	
92.	 It	may	be	objected	 that	when	Aristotle	 says,	 in	 the	 two-syllogism	passage	
that	“hē d’ epithumia agei”	(NE 7.3,	1147b34),	he	means	that	appetite	leads	to	
action,	and	not	merely	that	it	urges	the	agent	to	action.	As	evidence	for	such	
usage	of	agein one	may	point	to,	for	example,	NE 7.3,	1146b23–4,	where	the	
intemperate	person	is	said	to	be	led and	this	must	mean,	in	the	context	that	
she	acts while	being	led	on.	However,	the	general	sense	of	agein in	practical	
contexts	is	to	“lead	to	action,”	where	it	is	not	necessary	that	the	agent	who	is	
“led”	also	acts.	There	is	a	clear	passage	in	the	MM 2.6,	1201a28–35	document-
ing	such	usage.	The	self-controlled	man	there	is	said	to	be	led	by	his	appetite,	
but	to	refrain	from	doing	what	the	appetite	leads	him	to	do.	The	exact	sense	
of	agein	must	be	then	determined	by	its	context.	In	any	case,	it	is	reasonable	
to	assume	that	there	is	a	period	of	time,	in	which	the	uncontrolled agent	feels	
the	pull	of	appetite,	without	yet	succumbing	and	this	can	be	well	described	
by	appetite	leading	him	on.	It	is	only	the	precipitate	uncontrolled agent	who	
acts	immediately	without	a	period	of	such	struggle.
93.	Rowe	(1971,	119)	has	anticipated	me	in	offering	a	similar	“two-stage”	analysis	
of	these	passages,	such	that	passage	(1)	describes	the	agent	in media and	the	
latter	passage	(11)	before	the	action.	However,	Rowe	thinks	that,	while	the	
agent	acts	without	control,	he	is	unaware	of	what	she	is	doing	(but	that	she	
was	aware	of	it	beforehand).
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explained	 them	 above)	 for	 holding	 or	 rejecting	 either	 of	 them.	 But	
since	it	is	the	bad	conclusion	and	not	the	good	one	that	is	associated	
with	pleasure	in	the	agent’s	experience,	it	is	the	bad	one	that	moves	
her	to	act.
Before	moving	on,	it	will	be	useful	to	return	to	the	distinction	be-
tween	 the	 impetuous	and	 the	weak	uncontrolled	agent.	 It	might	be	
thought	that	even	if	my	interpretation	works	well	for	the	impetuous	
type,	 it	 still	needs	 to	explain	what	happens	 in	 the	case	of	 the	weak	
uncontrolled	agent	who,	after	all,	 is	supposed	to	reason	beforehand	
and	make	the	right	decision.	Does	she	then	fail	to	draw	the	right	con-
clusion	from	her	decision	to	the	right	action,	or	does	she	somehow	fail	
to	know	the	conclusion	even	once	she	has	drawn	it?	What	exactly	is	
her	failure?	
Here,	it	 is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	interpretation	I	am	
arguing	for	does	not	explain	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	action	simply	as	
a	(local)	cognitive	failure	to	draw,	or	to	know	once	drawn,	a	conclusion	
of	a	syllogism.95	In	fact,	Aristotle’s	explanation	of	why	the	uncontrolled	
agent’s	decision	 loses	 its	motivational	efficacy	does	not	concern	 the	
uncontrolled	 agent’s	 failure	 to	 attend	 to	 any	 particular	 proposition	
or	belief.	Rather,	he	thinks	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	ends	up	in	a	
(global)	state	of	mind	in	which	thinking	—	understood	as	a	highly	spe-
cific	ability	that	crucially	involves	critical	evaluation	or	reflection	on	
the	basis	of	reasons	—	is	impeded	(due	to	the	physiological	processes	
associated	with	her	appetites)	and	that	in	that state	of	mind	she	can-
not	be	motivated	by	reasons	that	go	over	and	above	appearances	and	
so,	ultimately,	over	and	above	pleasure	and	pain.	So,	the	agent	might	
well	be	able	to	draw	a	conclusion	of	a	practical	syllogism,	if	one	wants	
to	speak	that	way	(she	can,	after	all,	“reason”	in	the	way	in	which	ex-
perience	allows	one	 to	 reason,	as	 I	 explained	above).	But	 that	does	
not	mean	 that	 she	 also	has,	 at	 that	moment,	 active understanding	 of	
95.	 The	syllogistic	apparatus	introduced	in	NE 7.3	is	 in	any	case	interpreted	as	
representing	 an	 explanation	 of	 an	 action	 rather	 than	 an	 actual	 process	 of	
thought.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 there	 is	 one	 syllogism	 that	 explains	 the	
agent’s	 resistance	before	 the	action,	 and	another	one	 that	explains	her	un-
controlled	action.
(14)	Since	the	last	proposition	is	a	belief	both	about	some-
thing	perceptible	and	controls	action,	this	is	what	the	un-
controlled	 agent	does	not	have,	 being	 affected	 as	he	 is,	
or	he	has	it	in	a	way	in	which	we	said	having	was	not	a	
matter	of	knowing,	but	of	saying,	as	with	the	drunk	and	
the	verses	of	Empedocles.	(NE 7.3,	1147b9–12)
Commentators	are	split	between	those	who	think	that	“the	last	prop-
osition”	refers	 to	 the	particular	premise	(and	so	the	passage	has	 led	
them	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 particular	 premise	 as	 the	 principal	 item	of	 ig-
norance	for	Aristotle’s	analysis),	and	those	who	think	that	it	refers	to	
the	good	conclusion.	The	arguments	for	both	positions	are	now	well-
known.94	It	seems	to	me	that	the	important	point	in	the	passage	is	that	
the	way	in	which	the	agent	has	the	“last	proposition”	—	which	just	is	
the	proposition	that	expresses	the	belief	that	would	led	her	to	refrain	
from	acting	without	control	—	is	precisely	the	same	way	in	which	hav-
ing	knowledge	is	characterized	in	passages	1	and	9.	The	agent	can	be	
aware	of	it	and	report	it,	but	she	does	not	hold	it	in	a	way	in	which	it	
would	be	supported	by	some	beliefs	or	facts	which	she	would	identify	
as	her	reasons	for	holding	it.	Thus	the	good	conclusion	(if	we	adopt	
this	interpretation	for	the	sake	of	simplicity)	is	on	a	par	with	the	bad	
conclusion	—	the	agent	cannot	attend	to	reasons	(in	the	sense	I	have	
94.	That	 the	phrase	refers	 to	 the	particular	premise	 is	 the	 traditional	view.	For	
arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 view	 that	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 conclusion	 see	Hardie	
(1981,	287–289)	and	especially	Charles	(1984,	120–121).	One	can	argue	that	
there	are	 textual	 reasons	 to	believe	 that	 “the	 last	proposition”	does	or	 can	
refer	to	the	good	conclusion.	In	particular	it	can	be	argued	that	protasis could	
or	should	be	translated	as	“proposition”	and	not	as	“premise.”	This	allows	the	
meaning	of	“the	last	proposition”	to	be	conclusion	(i. e.,	the	last	proposition	of	
a	syllogism).	This	can	be	further	supported	by	observing	that	“the	last”	should	
not	refer	to	something	that	is	second	in	order,	but,	rather,	to	something	that	is,	
at	least,	third	in	order	and	hence	to	the	conclusion.	However,	the	view	seems	
to	me	unlikely	in	view	of	1147a25–6	where	the	particular	premise	is	said	to	
be	about	particulars	of	which	perception	is	in	control.	When	then	Aristotle	
says	 that	 “the	 last	proposition	 is	 a	belief	 about	 something	perceptible	and	
controls	actions,”	his	language	seems	to	point	rather	straightforwardly	to	the	
particular	premise.	Moreover,	since	he	used	the	language	of	conclusion	be-
fore	(1147a27),	it	is	unclear	why	he	should	refrain	from	using	it	here.
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We	 are	 told	 that	what	 Socrates	was	 looking	 for	 in	 his	 account	 also	
“comes	about”	and	that	it	does	so	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	last	term	
does	not	seem	to	be	either	universal	or	as	expressive	of	knowledge	as	
the	universal	term.	Second,	the	affective	state	(i. e.,	the	state	in	which	
the	uncontrolled	agent	 is	when	he	succumbs)	does	not	come	about	
when	knowledge	in	the	primary	or	proper	(kuriōs) sense	is	present,	but	
only	when	perceptual	knowledge	is	present.	It	is	also	not	this	knowl-
edge	 in	 the	primary	 sense,	 but	 (it	 seems	plausible	 to	 think)	merely	
knowledge	of	what	one	perceives	that	gets	“dragged	about.”	
The	meaning	of	“the	last	term”	has	been	well	explained	by	David	
Charles.96	As	he	argues,	it	must	refer	to	the	term	which	is	introduced	
as	the	last	one	in	a	syllogism.	In	a	practical	syllogism,	this	must	be	the	
subject	of	the	particular	premise,	which	designates	“either	an	action	
or	a	particular	object	to	be	acted	on.”97	The	two	universal	terms,	one	
of	which	serves	as	 the	predicate	 in	 the	particular	premise,	are	 intro-
duced	in	the	universal	premise	that	comes	first	in	practical	syllogisms.	
If	Charles	is	correct,	it	is	knowledge	of	what	one	currently	perceives	
that	gets	“dragged	about”	rather	than,	say,	knowledge	of	what	is	good	
and	bad.	This	is	corroborated	later	in	the	passage	when	Aristotle	says	
that	it	is	perceptual	knowledge	that	is	present	and	gets	dragged	about	
when	the	agent	acts	without	control.
The	 phrase	 “the	 affective	 state	 does	 not	 come	 about	when	what	
seems	to	be	knowledge	 in	 the	primary	sense	 is	present”	has	 looked	
implausible	to	many	commentators.	On	most	interpretations	the	only	
item	 that,	 according	 to	 Aristotle’s	 analysis,	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	
lacks	(does	not	use,	does	not	use	properly,	etc.)	when	acting	without	
control	is	the	particular	premise	that	would	lead	to	the	good	conclu-
sion	of	the	practical	syllogism.	But	knowledge	“in	the	primary	sense,”	
which	 is	generally	 taken	 to	be	universal	knowledge	 (i. e.	knowledge	
of	the	universal	premise),	was	something	the	uncontrolled	agent	was	
supposed	to	have	actively	in	mind.	But	that	is	exactly	not	what	this	last	
96.	Charles	(1984,	122–4).
97.	 Ibid.,	122.
that	conclusion	 in	 the	kind	of	 reflective	way	which	 is	systematically	
grounded	in	her	grasp	of	the	relevant	conceptual	and	logical	connec-
tions	that	it	bears	to	her	other	relevant	beliefs	and	values	(even	if	she	
can	recount	these	connections).	
One	can	describe	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	failure	as	cognitive,	but	
doing	so	is	not	particularly	useful	since,	on	the	one	hand,	her	non-ra-
tional	cognition	is	working	perfectly	well	and	her	rational	cognition	is	
not	operational	to	begin	with.	It	is	also	not	particularly	useful	to	try	to	
capture	her	failure	by	the	difference	between	practical	and	theoretical	
cognition,	so	that	the	agent	would	have	the	latter,	but	not	the	former	
kind	of	cognition.	At	the	time	she	acts,	 the	uncontrolled	agent	does	
not	have	a	merely	 theoretical	knowledge	of	her	conclusion	(or	deci-
sion)	since	she	has	in	fact	no	true	understanding	of	it	to	begin	with	(in	
fact,	if	she	did	have	theoretical	understanding,	she	would	have	practi-
cal	one	too).	 If	anything,	hers	 is	a	 failure	of	character	 insofar	as	her	
ability	 to	guide	her	behavior	 in	a	rational,	 reflective	way	sometimes	
disappears	when	faced	with	her	appetites.	Her	behavior	is	then	guided	
by	her	accumulated	experience	(empeiria)	and	habit	(Cf.	1152a27–34).	
4.  Socrates’ Account Coming About
At	 the	very	end	of	NE 7.3,	Aristotle	 famously	returns	 to	Socrates’	ac-
count	and	compares	it	to	his	own:	
(15)	And	since	 the	 last	 term	does	not	seem	to	be	either	
universal	 or	 as	 expressive	 of	 knowledge	 as	 the	 univer-
sal	 term,	 also	 what	 Socrates	 was	 looking	 for	 seems	 to	
come	about.	For	the	affective	state	does	not	come	about	
when	what	seems	to	be	knowledge	in	the	primary	sense	
(kuriōs)	is	present,	nor	is	it	this	knowledge	that	is	dragged	
about	because	of	 the	affective	state,	but	 [when]	percep-
tual	knowledge	[is	present].	Let	this	much,	then,	be	said	
about	 knowing	 and	 not	 knowing,	 and	 about	 how	 it	 is	
possible	act	without	control	while	still	being	in	a	state	of	
knowledge.	(NE 7.3,	1147b13–7)
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Thus	even	what	Socrates	was	saying	comes	about	because,	when	
an	uncontrolled	action	takes	place,	knowledge	 in	 the	primary	sense	
(i. e.	actively	attended	to)	is	not	present.	The	uncontrolled	agent	does	
not	 follow	his	passions	against	his	knowledge	while	actively	attend-
ing	to	it.	No	such	“dragging	about”	of	knowledge	happens.	The	only	
thing	that	is	“dragged	about”	(in	a	way)	and	interfered	with	directly	is	
perceptual	knowledge.	But	the	perceptual	knowledge	that	is	dragged	
about	 is	 also	not	present	as	 knowledge	when	 the	agent	 is	 in	 the	af-
fective	state.	If	the	knowledge	that	is	not	present	is	said	to	be	active	
knowing,	then	it	is	just	as	true	that	knowledge	of	the	universal	term	
is	 inactive	as	 it	 is	 that	knowledge	of	 the	particular	premise	 (percep-
tual	 knowledge)	 is	 inactive.	However,	 the	 information	 contained	 in	
the	particular	premise	is	utilized	by	the	appetite	in	the	uncontrolled	
action.	Perceptual	knowledge	is	dragged	about	in	this	sense.101
5. Are uncontrolled actions voluntary?
Does	Aristotle’s	 theory	 of	 uncontrolled	 action	manage	 to	 avoid	 the	
charge	 of	 involuntariness?	 If	 it	 cannot,	 it	 would	 contradict	 Aristo-
tle’s	claim	that	uncontrolled	actions	are	voluntary	(1152a14–6).	Since	
a	proper	answer	would	require	a	careful	 interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	
theory	of	voluntary	action,	I	will	confine	my	remarks	to	only	the	most	
pressing	concerns.102 
It	might	be	useful	to	distinguish	between	two	questions:	(A)	wheth-
er	the	uncontrolled	agent’s	action	is	voluntary	under	the	description	
101.		This	understanding	of	the	passage	is	not	without	its	problems.	First,	it	makes	
Aristotle	 contrast	 active	 knowledge	 with	 perceptual	 knowledge,	 and	 that	
does	not	 seem	be	as	proper	a	contrast	as	 that	between	universal	and	par-
ticular	 knowledge.	 Second,	on	my	 interpretation	perceptual	 knowledge	 is	
not	present	any	more	than	active	knowledge	is	present	contrary	to	what	the	
text	says.	It	requires	that	one	qualifies	Aristotle’s	claim	that	only	perceptual	
knowledge	is	present	by	adding	“but	not	as	knowledge.”	
102.		In	particular,	I	do	not	address	the	issue	that,	in	the	Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle	
appears	to	require	that	the	agent	has	knowledge	(in	the	technical	sense)	if	
she	is	to	act	voluntarily	(e. g.,	2.9,	1225b10–7).	A	view	of	Aristotle’s	theory	of	
voluntary	action	along	 these	 lines	 is	argued	 for	 in	Charles	 (2012).	 I	argue	
that	this	is	not	in	fact	Aristotle’s	view	in	“Agency	and	Responsibility	in	Aris-
totle’s	Eudemian Ethics,” forthcoming	in	Phronesis	60:	206–51.	
paragraph	says.98	Scholars	have	thus	adopted	Stewart’s	conjecture	that	
instead	of	“parousēs ginetai”	in	line	1147b16	we	should	read	“periginetai.”99 
The	sentence	then	reads	“the	knowledge	that	is	overcome	when	some-
one	is	in	the	affective	state	is	not	what	seems	to	be	knowledge	in	the	
primary	sense.”	In	this	case,	what	is	overcome	is	knowledge	of	what	
one	perceives	(i. e.,	 the	particular	premise),	and	not	universal	knowl-
edge,	which	is	knowledge	in	the	primary	sense.100 
However,	we	now	have	a	way	to	preserve	the	text	as	received.	The	
idea	is	that	“knowledge	in	the	primary	sense”	means	knowledge	that	
is	actively	attended	to,	rather	than	universal	knowledge.	As	I	have	ar-
gued,	 such	knowledge	 (i. e.	 actively	attended	 to	as knowledge)	 is	 in-
deed	not	present	when	one	acts	without	control.	Because	of	his	cur-
rent	affective	state	(pathos),	the	agent	does	not	and	cannot	actively	at-
tend	to	her	knowledge	as	knowledge.	That	“knowledge	in	the	primary	
sense”	(kuriōs epistēmē)	is	knowledge	which	is	actively	attended	to,	can	
be	clearly	seen	from	DA 2.5,	417a21–b2.	There	Aristotle	distinguishes	
three	ways	of	calling	someone	“knowing”	—	either	someone	is	of	the	
genus	of	beings	that	by	nature	possess	knowledge,	or	someone	knows	
because	he	has	learnt	and	can	recall	what	he	knows	at	will,	or	he	is	
someone	who	is	knowing	kuriōs, i. e.	someone	who	is	“already	attend-
ing	[to	his	knowledge],	and	 is	 in	actuality	and	 in	 the	primary	sense	
knowing”	(DA	2.5,	417a28–9).	This	supports	the	claim	that	in	our	pas-
sage	 in	 the	NE, knowledge	 in	 the	proper	sense	 is	knowledge	 (what-
ever	it	might	be	knowledge	of	—	whether	of	universal	or	particulars)	
that	is	actively	attended	to	by	the	one	who	has	it.
98.	Stewart	(1892,	vol.	2,	163–4).	Stewart’s	suggested	explanation	was	that	“true	
ἐπιστήμη,	which	 he	 (i. e.	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent)	 has	—	and	 has	 conscious-
ly	—	is	not	in	a	position	to	be	affected	by	πάθος,	because	it	is	universal,	and	so	
does	not	enter	the	arena	of	particular	action.”	Stewart	himself	admitted	that	
this	is	to	skate	on	very	thin	ice,	and	suggested	an	alternative	reading	of	the	
Greek	text	(explained	below).	
99.	For	example:	Broadie	and	Rowe,	ad	loc.;	Gauthier	and	Jolif, ad	loc.;	Robinson	
(1969,	199).
100.		Most	 commentators	 think	 of	 “knowledge	 in	 the	 primary	 sense”	 here	 as	
knowledge	 of	 the	 universal	 premise.	 Burnet	 (1900,	 305)	 interprets	 it	 as	
knowledge	where	all	the	terms	are	universals,	i. e.	scientific	knowledge.	
	 jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control
philosophers’	imprint	 –		32		– vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015)
be	done	or	should	not	be	done,	 though	not	 through	reasoning”	 (EE 
2.11,	1226b23–5).	One	can	know	that	in	order	to	get	X,	one	should	do	Y,	
without	at	the	same	time	grasping	(or	being	capable	of	grasping),	the	
reason	why	Y	is	suitable	for	X.105
Still,	one	might	wonder	whether	 the	claim	 that	 the	uncontrolled	
agent’s	transition	from	adhering	to	her	decision	to	acting	without	con-
trol	is	explained	by	physiological	processes	rather	than	any	intentional	
activity	is	compatible	with	the	agent’s	being	responsible	for	what	she	
is	doing.	Does	this	mean	that	the	appetite	is	irresistible	to	the	agent?	
As	Aristotle	sees	it,	there	are	certain	norms	(presumably	social	norms)	
that	govern	what	adult	human	beings	are	expected	to	resist.	Acting	in	
a	certain	capacity	is	generally	governed	by	certain	norms	or	standards	
pertaining	 to	 that	 capacity.	 For	 example,	 if	 one	 is	 acting	 as	 a	 physi-
cian,	then	there	are	certain	standards	that	one	is	expected	to	fulfill.	If	
one	does	not	 fulfill	 them	one	can	be	 justly	held	 responsible	 for	 the	
failure	 (unless	 one	 fails	 because	of	 some	 recognized	problem,	 such	
as	disease).106	In	a	similar	way,	being	an	adult	human	being	within	a	
society	implies	certain	expectations	or	norms	and	failure	to	fulfill	them	
may	be	blameworthy:
(16)	But	since	knowing	and	understanding	is	of	two	kinds,	
one	having	and	the	other	using	knowledge,	the	man	who	
has	knowledge	but	does	not	use	it	could	in	a	way	rightly	
be	 said	 to	have	 acted	 in	 ignorance,	 but	 in	 another	way	
not;	 for	 example,	 if	 he	 failed	 to	 use	 his	 knowledge	 be-
cause	 of	 negligence.	 Likewise,	 too,	 someone	would	 be	
blamed	even	if	he	did	not	have	it,	 if	 it	 is	what	was	easy	
105.	Cf.	NE 7.10,	1152a14–6.
106.		“Surely	then	there	is	a	standard	(tis horos)	also	for	the	physician,	by	reference	
to	which	he	judges	what	is	healthy	for	a	body	and	what	is	not,	and	towards	
which	each	thing	is	to	be	done	up	to	a	certain	extent	and	[one	is]	healthy	
when	[it	is	done]	well,	but	not	if	more	or	less	[is	done].	So	it	is	also	for	the	
excellent	person	concerning	his	actions	and	choices	of	things	naturally	good	
but	not	praised”	(1248a21–b2).
under	which	it	is	uncontrolled	and	(B)	whether	the	uncontrolled	agent	
acts	without	control	while	knowing	—	in	some	sense	of	the	word	—	that	
what	she	does	is	wrong.103	As	I	have	already	argued,	B	is	true	—	the	un-
controlled	agent	can	be	aware	that	what	she	does	is	wrong,	even	if	her	
awareness	of	that	fact	does	not	count	as	knowledge,	strictly	speaking.	
Concerning	A,	we	need	to	ask	what	the	description	under	which	
an	action	is	uncontrolled	is.	There	are	two	options:	either	(1)	the	agent	
acts	as	she	does	on	account	of	the	very	feature	that	made	her	originally	
decide	not	to	act	that	way,	yet	she	is	unaware	of	this	fact;	or	(2)	the	
agent	acts	as	she	does	on	account	of	the	very	feature	that	made	her	
originally	decide	not	to	act	that	way	while	being	aware	that,	according	
to	her	decision,	she	should	not	be	acting	that	way.	As	I	have	argued	
in	section	2,	actions	falling	under	option	1	need	not	be	cases	of	lack	of	
control,	but	also	of	forgetfulness,	inattention,	absent-mindedness,	and	
so	on.	This	means	that	the	relevant	description	is	the	one	in	option	2.
According	to	Aristotle,	“Since	involuntary	action	is	either	forced	or	
[done]	through	ignorance,	the	voluntary	would	seem	to	be	that	which	
has	its	principle	in	the	agent	himself,	knowing	(eidoti) the	particulars	
of	the	action”	(NE 3.1,	1111a21–4).	On	the	view	I	attributed	to	Aristotle,	
the	uncontrolled	action	 is	not	 forced	since	 its	causal	origin	 is	 in	the	
agent	(i. e.,	the	agent’s	appetite).	The	second	condition,	at	least	in	the 
Nicomachean Ethics, cannot	be	understood	as	 requiring	 that	 in	order	
to	act	voluntarily	one	has	to	have	knowledge (strictly	speaking)	of	the	
particulars	since	both	children	and	animals	act	voluntarily	(111a25–30,	
1111b5–10).	 If	 the	 condition	 is,	 accordingly,	 understood	 as	 requiring	
that	 the	 agent	 is	 aware	of	 the	particulars,	my	 view	 satisfies	 it	 since	
the	uncontrolled	agent	is	perfectly	well	aware	of	the	particulars	of	her	
situation	and	action.	It	is	notable	that	the	list	of	particulars	at	1111a2–6	
does	not	 include	 knowledge	of	 the	why	 (dia ti).104	As	Aristotle	 says,	
“nothing	prevents	that	the	many	have	a	belief	that	something	should	
103.		This	 obviously	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 she	 knows	 that	 she	 is	 acting	without 
control.
104.		It	does	include	knowledge	of	the	result	at	which	she	aims,	but	that	is	quite	
different	from	grasping	the	dia ti.
	 jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control
philosophers’	imprint	 –		33		– vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015)
recognizes	that	much	of	our	behavior	is	not	guided	by	reflective	think-
ing	(even	if	such	thinking	is	the	one	characteristic	of	human	beings)	
but	rather	relies	on	much	more	basic	processes	that	may	superficially	
look	like	thinking	(in	the	strict	sense)	but	are	in	fact	only	extremely	
complex	exercises	of	our	capacity	for	perception	and	memory.	Anoth-
er	striking	idea	is	that	the	capacity	for	reflective,	deliberative	thinking	
is	not	separated	from	bodily	processes,	even	if	it	is	perhaps	not	bodily	
itself.	On	the	contrary,	purely	physiological	processes	can	lead	to	its	
inhibition	even	while	they	do	not	inhibit	(at	least	not	to	the	same	ex-
tent)	the	more	basic	cognitive	processes.	The	very	human	capacity	of	
reasoning	which	is	so	powerful	is	thus,	at	the	same	time,	characterized	
by	inherent	fragility	insofar	as	it	is	coupled	with	bodily	processes	over	
which	it	(and	so	we)	have	little	or	no	direct	control.	Aristotle’s	complex	
theory	of	lack	of	control	is	thus	perhaps	the	best	witness	to	both	the	
power	and	the	fragility	of	reason	as	Aristotle	conceives	of	it.
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